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A few months ago, I read my first Christian Apologetics book, Orthodoxy by G.K. Chesterton and hated it. When I discussed it with my friend Scott, he lent me Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis. I must admit, this Christian Apologetics book was much better, even insightful. It was logically written, with clear definitions and little appeal to emotion. Lewis’s approach to defending his religion is the polar opposite of Chesterton’s. It was a joy to read. Well at least the first half for reasons I will discuss later.
This short book is so dense with interesting thoughts and claims that I plan on limiting my discussion to what I consider the three most interesting topics. In the interest of brevity, I will also spread those topics over three separate posts. The three topics are the existence of God, The Case for Christ, and ethical insights. Here is the first:
Lewis starts the book by using a simplified version of the normative moral argument for the existence of god. That is, moral laws are ‘outside of’ ourselves. In other words, moral obligations are independent of one’s goals and universal.
1. It appears to human beings that moral normativity exists.
2. The best explanation of moral normativity is that it is grounded in God.
3. Therefore God exists.
The key word is in premise 1: “appears”. Morality only has the appearance of normativity but is in fact, not normative at all. Furthermore, this appearance has an explanation best grounded in nature. Consider the possibility that morality is an evolved, social instinct. This would then create instinctual moral obligations in almost all (not all, due to genetic variation and/or mental deficiencies) members of the species. i.e. our moral instincts would have the appearance of being universal. Secondly, such an instinct is social and acts on the group level. Thus the moral instinct would sometimes conflict with our one’s own goals. Thus the instinct would have all the appearance of normativity.
Lewis does address the possibility that morality is an instinct. Lewis claims that morality cannot be an instinct because it helps us choose between two competing instincts. He uses the example of hearing a man crying for help. We may feel two competing instincts, one to help the man, the other to not help out of self-preservation. Morality tells us which of these two instincts we ought to obey: help the man. Because morality helps us choose between two instincts, Lewis claims, it cannot itself be an instinct. Furthermore, he says, morality often sides with the weaker instinct.
Lewis’s rebuttal is a defense of premise 2. He’s basically arguing that the natural explanation of morality as instinct is not an adequate one. I see a few of problems this rebuttal. First, the ‘ought’ feeling we get could be part of the instinct to help. This feeling would simply make the ‘help’ instinct stronger. Thus morality wouldn’t compel us to choose the weaker instinct, it’s simply the part of the instinct that gives weight to the social instinct.
The second problem needs more elucidation. Lewis precludes the possibility of meta-instincts; in this case, social instincts. As highly social animals, it should come as no surprise that our social instincts (help the man) sometimes conflict with our animal instincts (self-preservation). The ‘ought’ feeling comes from the fact that the helping instinct is social. Not only do I feel the instinct to help the man, but everyone I know would feel the same. Thus I know I ought to help in order to win social status and avoid social scorn. No one, of course, actually thinks through these logical steps, it is simply felt. As members of a species that completely depends on social interactions for survival, it should come as no surprise that we’ve evolved instincts to help us maintain our social networks.
Finally, I contend that premise 2 is out-and-out false. Variations of this premise are constantly recycled by religionists. Consider Creationists, “the best explanation of the complexity of life is God” or the argument from love, “the best explanation of love is God”, or the argument from consciousness, “The best explanation for consciousness is God”. All of these take the same form:
1. [Insert something that I don't understand] exists.
2. The best explanation for [Insert something I don't understand] is God.
3. Therefore God exists.
These are just veiled versions of a logical fallacy called argumentum ad ignorantiam (the argument from ignorance). When we lack a natural explanation, it is fallacious to assume that there isn’t a natural explanation to be found. We simply may not have found it yet. Thus even if I’m entirely wrong in my natural explanation of morality (Indeed, I very well could be since evolutionary psychology is a new and scientifically controversial field), it gives absolutely no credence to any supernatural explanations, including God.
Notice that this very same logical mistake is made outside of religion. Simply replace the word “God” with ‘ghosts’, ‘aliens’, or the “Flying Spaghetti Monster” and you can see that the argument from ignorance can be used to conclude all sorts of ridiculous things.
In conclusion, Lewis fails to firmly establish the existence of God. But suppose for a moment that he had. Okay, a Moral Law Giver exists. This is far from concluding that God as described in the Bible exists. Lewis admits as much in Part I of Mere Christianity. Hence Part II of his book, which I will address in a future post.
I think you sell premise no. 2 short.
-The best explanation for famine is god.
-The best explanation for suffering is god
-The best explanation for disease is god
I could go on, but you can plainly see the merit of this line of thinking.
ejd
Well, we can pin disease and suffering to god, but the blame for famine clearly belongs to the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
Sorry guys, but famine is actually the fault of I, Snurp. My bad, as they say.
Ok first, Sid you made your post a bit too intellectual for laymans, like myself, to try to really comprehend what you are saying about morality and God. I am going to try and break it down dummy style…
So basically what I am getting from this is that Lewis states that moral normativaty is due to God and not an instinct because it help guides our instinct. And Sid you believe that moral normativity could be attributed to social evolution, at least that is what I got out of it.
To me, and I have not read any books relating to religion or researched the arguments for or against God, I feel that morality can be both attributed to God AND a piece of social evolution. I believe firmly that our natural instinct is self preservation; however, part of self preservation mean forming communities of some sort. In order for man to form a community they need to lean on each other for many things. You can also add to that, adaption of a moral behavior. When man was roaming as seperate small tribes I don’t think they would stop and help a man crying for help, unless, that man happened to belong to their tribe and they need him for hunting or protection. Then their need for self preservation kicks in but bends to the moral decision…help the guy or their will be less food.
Without this thought process there would not have been many successful communities and no great civilazation would arise out of anything.
Well that is just my two sense, heck I don’t even know if it makes sense!
No, that made sense. I’m so you are saying that evolutionary psychology may account for our moral sentiments up to a point, but God is required for inter-tribal altruism.
While it may be the case that the natural explanation I provided fails to fully account for our sense of morality, it still doesn’t overcome my final objection. Lack of evidence for a natural explanation is not the same as evidence for a supernatural explanation.
There is, however, a way out for the theist. This is the idea of guided nature or, more particularly, guided evolution. God created the natural laws with full knowledge that those processes would instill in humans God’s desired moral instincts. In other words, God used nature to create our moral instincts. Thus morality would be both naturally caused and God-given. There are other problems with this view, but I don’t want to get into them now.
The problem with your argument though is that everything has a natural explanation, we just haven’t found it. Isn’t that the same flaw you are arguing against in Lewis’s book?
You can’t discount God as an argument because you believe there is a natural explanation you haven’t found. Just the same as someone can’t discount your argument that there isn’t a natural explanation. It is a circular argument that can be used by both parties.
What it all goes down to is that there will always be unexplained things, some will get explained (I guess it is true that the world is round, who would have thought!) and others won’t. Maybe some of those will be answered by nature but with that answer will most likely come more questions.
Some people feel more comfortable assiging God as the answer to the unanswerable (at this time) while others feel comfortable know (or believing) that there is a natural answer that we will find (I still can’t believe the world is round…). So either way, there is a flaw in each argument and neither will ever fully be answered.
1. [Insert something that I don’t understand] exists.
2. The best explanation for [Insert something I don’t understand] is God.
3. Therefore God exists.
See I don’t think that this is what CS is doing. Do some theists do this, particularly with evolution? Surely. I personally think that I understand the current evolutionary theory. Not on a Masters or PhD level, but well enough. I still think that it fails very short on explaining how you and I got here. The “best explanation” for our presence here, I think, is design. Part of that design includes elements of things like evolution. I do think you hit the nail on the head with the idea that even if the final therefore is true, it doesn’t mean that the god in question is the Christian one.
Glad you enjoyed the book. Can’t wait to hear/read more.
Oh and regarding the above as an explanation of morality, I do think, much like evolution, God laid the groundwork and we have done the rest. So I don’t see it as an either or.
“The problem with your argument though is that everything has a natural explanation, we just haven’t found it. Isn’t that the same flaw you are arguing against in Lewis’s book?”
Ah, but I am not making the argument that there is a natural explanation for everything, including morality. I’m merely saying that lack of such an explanation is not the same as confirmation for a supernatural one. Evidence is the key.
The reflection of that argument could be used if I stated that there is no evidence for a supernatural cause thus the cause must be natural. What I’m admitting is that we don’t know. “I Don’t know” is not the same as “God-did-it” nor is it the same as “nature-did-it”.
I feel comfortable admitting my own ignorance. I did posit a potential natural explanation, but I’m no expert. I’ll let the experts and the peer-reviewed science journals confirm, replace, or replace that hypothesis.
Hey Scott! I was wondering when you would notice this post.
It’s not the argument he started with, but it is the rebuttal he tried to use against the morality-as-an-instinct objection. The one he started with is the normative morality argument. Bringing up the possibility of a moral-instinct demonstrates the morality could only have the appearance of normativity.
“The “best explanation†for our presence here, I think, is design.”
But positing design or a designer creates all sort of questions as regards the designer itself, like its nature, how it came to be, how that design organized itself if there is no posited “designer,” etc. Correct me if I’m misconstruing your argument, as I may very well be, but it sounds like “best explanation” can be substituted for “simpler,” “less complicated,” “more likely,” and things along those lines. But if this is what you’re doing, my response is that it only sounds that way. I think Dawkins argues at some point that while positing a “designer” makes everything sound less complicated, in reality when you try to explain the designer itself that whole approach kind of goes out the window.
I’m still puzzling over a really good response to your post Sid. I’ll let you know when I have one.
Snurp, perhaps I should say that of all the explanations I’ve heard for our presence here, a creator/desigher makes more sense to me. Evolution doesn’t simplify things nor does creation. However we got here it wasn’t simple. At some point it gets hard to say what is more or less complex. I simply can’t envison the universe arriving here with us in it as a series of random events. Also the science as I understand it is awfully young for me to put much of my trust in. Maybe that makes me short sighted or narrow minded or something. Considering how little we know about our own planet, much less the universe, well it amazes me that there are those that say, “Yup definitely evolved from a monkey like being.”
Howdy all,
I think there are a few assumptions about morality used in the arguments here that need to be questioned. Further I think the concept of morality has been over simplified. I believe the concept of moral normativity is specious at best. When someone is surrounded by a society with similar moral precepts it is easy to believe that in the normativity of your moral paradigm.
To me morality comes down to one fundermental question. What is the difference between right and wrong, and why. Whilst a seemingly simply question, I think anyone who gives it due thought will soon realise how complicated it can become. The thing about morality is it is not entirely rationaly based. There is a mix of ratioanality and emotion. This makes things extrodiarily complicated. How can someone logically defend an action or belief that has a large emotional component.
Another problem with morality is that there is that it has no strict definition. The idea of morality differs vastly from person to person. There are alos many places to draw ones morality from. People seem to largely follow the precepts of the society they live in. This is what they know and have been taught. This is further influeced by peer groups and beliefs. How many people follow a moral code becuase it is what they know and have been taught versus a carefully considered and developed personal moral code. In answering that question I would ask you to consider this. When people are put into a situation they are unfamiliar with and society has no apparent moral guidence to offer what do they do. Consider diasasters and times of the breakdown of law and order.
With the last point in mind I would like to offer one last point for consideration. Humans tend to form communities to increase the chances of their survival. In order to live together certain rules and obligations are set down. As these needs are likely to be similar from community to community regardless of distance or ability to interact I believe some congruence is rather likely. This means that apparent normativity of societies morality does not necessarily mean that their is a universal moral perogative. Therfore one has to be very careful when using what is considered to be moral normativity as the basis of any argument.
I think any well considered moral belief system would have reached the conclusion that morality is very subjective. It varies according to the situation one finds themselves in. I won’t go into the different ways of approaching the development of a moral code or the different things one can (or should) consider as I would hope that you all understand how complex it can be. Consider instead that the questions of morality, justice and social obligations go back to before the greek philosopher’s who are famous for articualting the questions and still havn’t been answered. If you do some reaserch into the accepted practices of some countries (india and vietnam spring to mind) there are some normal and socially accepted practices there that most western cultures would general consider imoral.
Basically all that babbling up there was to make the point that any argument that uses the precept of morality as the basis of proof in an argument has made some fundamental assumptions. Morality is not simple and has not been proven to be normative. The things that create a person morality have not been altogether pinned down and I would guess come from many sources. Sources that in all likelyhood vary from person to person with different emphasis on sources from person to person.
Finally
1. It “APPEARS” to human beings that moral normativity exists.
2. “THE BEST EXPLANATION” of moral normativity is that it is grounded in God.
3. Therefore God exists.
The quotated bast of the reasoning above put this into the category of opinion rather than an argument to me. One would have to show moral normativity and then show how God is the best explanation. This I believe would be difficult and even if you had a good argument it could never be conclusive (at least the way I see it)
Cheers
Simon Bond
You are absolutely right, Simon Bond, morality is a staggeringly complex subject. That combined with its immense importance makes the topic so damn interesting to me.
In your comment, you took firm aim at premise 1 whereas I, after briefly challenging it, quickly moved to premise 2. This argument doesn’t have a premise to stand on!
I must admit that I find the question of morality to be rather interesting myself. It seems to me that alot of people don’t give it the consideration it deserves, particullarly considering how important it is.
When it comes to premise 2 there is quite a bit I could say but I would have ened up with a very lenghty post. Briefly though, I would have explored the idea of instincts, how one can train or alter them and how a making a choice is a vstly complicated process involving more than two competing insticts. I would also have exlpored the idea that whilst morality has an instictual component it has more to it than that. Finally I would have brought up (again) how emotional and rational imperitives do and do not work together.
I largely agree with you rebuttal of premise 2 on the understanding however that you have only looked at a small part of the issue. The way humans make desicions, moral or otherwise is once again a very complicated issue and I don’t think it can be fully explained by the simple explanations given. From your post I do get the impression that you would agree.
Cheers
Simon Bond
“I simply can’t envison the universe arriving here with us in it as a series of random events.”
Here, of course, is where we arrive at an impasse, as I am tempted to say, “‘design’ or ‘designer’ in some sort of overarching or guiding role that has a goal and purpose just seems to me like something created to make things more understandable.” However, don’t short-change yourself for doubting science. I am, when it comes down to it, a skeptic for the most part (which means when it comes to matters of simplicity I really should just throw all of it out as proving nothing), and I don’t hold science to be a harbinger of truth myself. What I do do is hold science to be a “provisional truth,” that is to say something as close to truth as we’ve been able to get given certain assumptions hold. Not very strong sounding, but something I can get behind. I think that science, when done properly, keeps this in mind (hence “theories,” no matter how widely believed and supported, rarely if ever become laws). “Scientism” on the other hand is a problem just like any other dogmatism.
Also, from Simon’s post:
“When people are put into a situation they are unfamiliar with and society has no apparent moral guidence to offer what do they do. Consider diasasters and times of the breakdown of law and order.”
My ethics teacher likes to use the example of a questionnaire given to college students which included the question: “If there were no laws, what would happen?” The majority of people thought that there would be chaos, riots, etc. About 13% of people said little or nothing would change, or at least their own behavior wouldn’t. It tells you a lot about what morals mean to people outside of “the law.”
Hello Simon Bond,
Indeed. But it is often useful to simplify a complex problem in order to begin to understand it. Lewis does make the mistake of oversimplifying instincts in this particular case. When I pointed out in my OP that the ‘ought’ feeling may be part of the ‘help’ instinct, I was implying that the ‘help’ instinct is more complex then Lewis would have us believe.
I would respond to the rest of your comment by repeating myself. Often, the only way to begin to understand a complex issue like human morality is to break it up into several, simpler pieces. Thus I am less resistant to looking at simplifications that are narrow in scope.
Hello Scott and Snurp,
I have a few thoughts here. First, as I’m sure you know, not being able to imagine something doesn’t render it impossible. I don’t understand certain aspects of general relativity, but I’m confident it is an accurate model.
Secondly, assuming randomness, the current state of the universe would be extremely unlikely from the point of view of the start-point. The question shouldn’t be “how likely is it that randomness led to the universe as we know it?”, it should be “how likely is it that randomness led to some universe in which some object(s) can observe it?”.
I would use the analogy of a lottery. From the point of view of the ticket buyer, they should ask “how likely is it that I’ll win?” Very unlikely, if one does the math. But from the point of view of the payer of the winnings, the question would be “how likely is it that someone will win?”. Quite likely, if enough tickets were sold.
Thus the unlikeliness that can’t envision may be quite likely, once we consider the number of possible universes that would contain consciousness.
Finally, I actually disagree with an underlying premise of the question. I happen to think that there is no randomness in the universe at all, only apparent randomness. Non-randomness, however does not imply purpose. Whether or not there is a purpose to the universe is an open, and extremely difficult question.
P.S. ‘Sid’, ‘Santini’, ‘Scott’, ‘Snurp’, ‘Simon’? Today’s comments brought to you by the letter ‘S’. What’s up with ‘ Disperser’
Howdy Sid,
I agree with you that it can be helpful to simplify in order to make a start at understanding complex issues and concepts. I was not so much concerned with your simplification as it was used to outline a few basic ideas that touched on the complexity of the issue at hand.
Lewis’s simplification of intinct and morality is of much more concern to me. This concern stems from the fact that he is using his simplified model as a proof. To me his simplification of how insticts and desicion making work as proof that morality cannot be an instinct is flawed becuase it shows (at least to me) that he does not fully understand the subject. If you do not fully understand the subject that you are talking about it is very unlikely that any conclusions reached by the simplified model you have contructed to understand it will be accurrate.
Therefore I would say that as his concept on instincts is so flawed that they are invalide as a basis to prove anything. In fact I would go so far as to say that his model is so innaccurate as to have no meaning at all. I think the way he has approached the question is flawed and not so easily defined.
I hope that better explains what I was getting at when I was talking about what I would say about premise 2. I agree that simplification of a concept is a usefull tool to approach a concept. It is dangerous however to use such a simplified model without fully understanding the concept as the basis of a proof.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Ah, that makes perfect sense. You object to using a simplification of a complex issue as proof for a tangential concept.
Now that I understand it, that’s a great point.
This may be merely incidental, but if I may point out, ReligiousFreaks posts 145-48, verify that the challenge was not actually mine.
MAPK LOTGRE Says:
March 2nd, 2007 at 10:25 pm
“[B]y those who say God created and sustains the universe, comets, thunder and the rising and setting of the sun are still attributed to supernatural forces. For your possible interest, read Orthodoxy, by G.K. Chesterton.â€
sidfaiwu Says:
March 3rd, 2007 at 10:26 am
“I’ll tell you what, I’ll read Orthodoxy by G.K. Chesterton if you’ll agree to read Why I Am Not a Christian by Bertrand Russel.”
MAPK LOTGRE Says:
March 3rd, 2007 at 2:40 pm
“I have meant to read Russsell’s “Why I Am Not A Christianâ€for some time, and accept your offer.”
sidfaiwu Says:
March 3rd, 2007 at 3:29 pm
“Fantastic!…Let me know which of the two you’d like to read first.”
I would like to add further, that the respective authors of “Orthodoxy†and “Mere Christianity both start with an inately human sense of the principle of justice. And for what it’s worth, reading Chesterton certainly had some bearing on Lewis’s thought processes.
“The final move came shortly after Lewis read G. K. Chesterton’s The Everlasting Man, from which he, for the first time, saw the whole Christian outline of history in a way that made sense.†http://www.greatcom.org/resources/skeptics_who_demanded_a_verdict/chap02/default.htm
Perhaps I should have just recommended reading the fourth chapter of “Orthodoxy,†Sid, but even in the most halting moments, you seemed nobly intent on finshing the book.
As I understand Lewis, he does not set out to prove God exists; he only starts with an argument for the existence of God to enable readers to follow his explanation of the basic, traditional tenets of Christianity, held by all Christians, regardless of (secondary,) denominational differences.
The one point Lewis brings on most strongly for the case of Christianity, I find, is that Jesus did not, and did not intend to leave us the option of taking him merely for a great moral teacher. Based on Jesus’ extra-ordinary claims for himself, “Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse,†says Lewis, in Book Two, in a section titled “The Shocking Alternative.”
In this discussion, I think it is useful, if not indeed necessary, to note a distinction between the moral standards different societies may set down and what is true moral action. As Simon Bond asks: “What is the difference between right and wrong, and why.†I ask: What makes any human action moral or immoral? Upon what ground do we judge any action to be moral or immoral? Although true moral principles of behaviour cannot be a matter of subjectivity, in order to function and prosper, any given society must accommodate its members, individually and collectively, with a set of behavioral standards. Concerning Christian morality, Lewis says that: “ Christ did not come to teach any brand new morality. The Golden Rule of the New Testament (Do as you would be done by) is a summing up of what everyone, at bottom, had always known to be right.â€
“Concerning Christian morality, Lewis says that: “ Christ did not come to teach any brand new morality. The Golden Rule of the New Testament (Do as you would be done by) is a summing up of what everyone, at bottom, had always known to be right.—
While the Golden Rule in its variations is probably the most pervasive moral standard in human history, that doesn’t guarantee it any special status. It may just have been the most necessary for communities in general to survive (that is, if this is that tack that you are trying to argue by (that the Golden Rule has a sort of special moral status)).
Also, as you bring up a distinction between “true” moral actions and the moral standards of differing societies, I would like to ask: what, to you, is a “true” moral action? And remember, you’re responding to someone who’s in the middle of reading Nietzsche’s total works.
Howdy all,
Mark l “Although true moral principles of behaviour cannot be a matter of subjectivity”
I think we could have a very interesting debate on that.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Hello MAPK L,
My apologies for forgetting who initiated the challenge. I’m certain that Chesterton influenced Lewis. I just found that Lewis suites me much better in the way he writes and argues.
You are correct in your assessment of Lewis’s main goal with the book. However, part I of Mere Christianity was dedicated entirely to proving God exists via a moral argument. I don’t have the text with me, so I cannot quote him directly, but he says that he needs to be sure he establishes a firm foundation on which the rest of book is supported. My point is that he failed in this respect. As a deist, this really isn’t a problem for me, since I accept the possibility of God’s existence via other arguments.
That will be the subject of my next post about the book. I probably will not be able to post it until I return from my trip. Look for it in about a week then we can discuss this topic. I’d hate to preempt my own post
Great discussion guys!
Thanks for the apology, Sid. I just wanted to make things clear for everyone’s benefit. And frankly, Lewis carries much more weight for me, too. But I may have a look at Chesterton’s “The Everlasting Man.â€
I believe–and I think Lewis would agree–that the existence of God, and even his character, can be shown to be highly probable, but not entirely provable. I believe God intends it to be that way, because he wants our love and trust in him to come by faith; ie., we can know God through the evidence he provides for us of himself: the very existence and beauty of the universe, and Christ incarnate, in particular.
If, for you, the evidence is insubstantial, the promises of God given in the Bible are what make it substantial for me.
To Snurp:
I have read very little, if any of Nietzsche in the past twenty years, but I believe it was he who first “officially†pronounced God dead. It would seem to me that apart from Divine authority, morality would still not be entirely subjective, but it would be essentially arbitrary.
I am not saying merely that The Golden Rule has a special moral status, I’m saying it encompases all morality, like the Ten Commandments, just compressed into one sentence. A true moral action is one that ultimately benefits the one and the many, and therefore breaks none of the ten commandments.
Basically my mention of Nietzsche was to note that I will be taking nothing for granted when to comes to defining morality, as Nietzsche does not. With that, to say that morality wouldn’t be wholly subjective but arbitrary sounds right. The most likely possibility in my mind is that morality would ultimately be chosen on some circumstances not specifically moral in themselves, but could be made to be applicable universally (The Golden Rule) and thereby made objective in a sense.
As for your definition of a true moral action, I guess it just feels vague to me. We would need to define “benefit,” since we can go from moral imperatives to utilitarianism to libertarianism to religious absolutism with the idea of “benefiting” the one and many unless we define it. Also, I would bet that you could find an action that benefits the one and the many while still breaking one or more of the ten commandments (admittedly this would be easier in regards to the earlier commandments which center around one’s relationship to God, but then I don’t have much of an issue with a prohibition of murder anyway).
Hey Snurp,
Does it sounds less vague to replace the word benefit with the word good?
A true moral action will always ultimately serve the common good and, consequently, the ultimate good of the individual as well.
I believe the reason we still use the Ten Commandments as a moral standard, thousands of years after they were written, is because all moral actions do fall within their framework.
I cannot comprehend how any sort of moral code could be established in the context of a moral void. The backbone of the principle of morals, in fact, I would say, is love.
And Simon Bond,
If you think morality can be subjective, I agree that it would be an interesting debate.
I would consider as a counterexample to all moral actions following under the ten commandments: I think defending someone’s freedom to believe whatever religion they choose (or, if they choose, no religion at all), even if it is not the Christian one, and standing against harm on those who believe otherwise, is a moral action – strictly speaking a violation of the Commandment, “You shall have no other gods before me.” Would you consider this act moral? It’s worth noting again the difference between the first few commandments and the ones further down the list, which have a much more obvious social focus.
As regards your newer definition, I agree with you in many contexts, but there are issues of free thought, expression, etc. that I think can lead to conflict. Protecting the public at large can result in many consequences as regards the individual that may be restrictive, harmful, etc. and not necessarily morally justifiable. I’m something of an individualist, so I worry when the “common good” appears as a justification.
As for how a moral code can be established in a nonmoral sense, social contract theories, though not true in a literal sense, give an example: there are some things that help groups of people to survive better. If people realize this they will follow these guidelines, which become established rules and eventually code, perhaps even taboo.
Howdy all,
Mark L, I have found that poeple differ on what objective and subjective means when it comes to applying it to morality. Therefore I would like to offer some clarification as to what I mean when I talk about subjective morality. I would suggest that morality is subjective in the sense that in the first, it is a human concept. I would not say it is nesscessarily subjective in the sense that there cannot be at least some agreement on guidlines of right and wrong among people and or differing societies.
But yes I would consider morality to be subjective. I would also not consider the ten commandents to be a valid moral standard. I do however think that parts of the ten commandents do demonstrate good moral guidlines.
I will admit I certainly don’t think I have morality completely worked out just yet. It is a process that I would guess will take up my entire life (on and off of course) without any promises that I will every completely find the answer.
I will have to think on your statement:
“A true moral action will always ultimately serve the common good and, consequently, the ultimate good of the individual as well.”
I have not decided upon its merit yet. I would agree a little with Snurp at the outset and say that alot would depend on who gets to decide on what is Good both for the all and for the individual.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Snurp:
Although Jesus did warn against the worshiping of false gods, his sharper and more frequent warnings were directed toward hypocrisy and false teachings among the presiding religious authorities of his time. (see Matthew 23), but he never resorted to any manner of conscription or coercion to gain followers.
“And if any man hear my words and believe not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world.†John 12:47
“Did not Moses give you the law, and yet none of you keepeth the law?†John 7:19
That is to say, the mosaic law was given in order to show that no one keeps it. For this reason, Jesus says, he came to fulfill the law.
According to Christ’s own teaching, then, come what may, we are free to submit or not, to the commandments in full or in part, by our own volition.
I share your view of the significance of the individual over the masses, but to say that a true moral act is one that ultimately serves the common good and the good of the individual, in itself, as far as I can see, justifies nothing.
Can you give a few examples of things existing outside a moral context which help societies to survive?
Simon Bond:
The only reason you have given for saying morality is subjective is that it is a human concept. Opinions are subjective, facts are objective, but concepts, specifically, are neither opinions nor facts. Moral standards do vary, but the principle of morality stands on objective truth. “[S]ome agreement on guidlines of right and wrong among people and or differing societies†(to use your own words on the side of objectivity) is a moral standard.
It is somewhat unclear to me on what basis you say the ten commandments are not a valid moral standard.
And lastly, democratic government is what gives each member of a society a voice in deciding what is the common good and good the of the individual.
“Can you give a few examples of things existing outside a moral context which help societies to survive?”
Bear with me on this one, it’s not completely coherent, and I’ve revised it a lot:
If you define moral acts/rules as simply things that help societies survive/improve societies, then you’re asking me to disprove a tautology, which is impossible. I can’t give an example of A not being A. It’s also an empty challenge, being a tautology (what is asking me to prove A is not A doing, after all? Nothing). But I don’t think you’d accept this definition on its own anyway. For one it makes morality completely secular, with no need whatsoever for religious or even really objective intention, and in fact makes morality a matter of prudence (what helps society/ies is good, what harms society/ies is bad, that’s all, no matter what the nature/motivation/etc of the act).
But there is also another way of understanding your definition of morality, which then asks, “Can you give any examples of things not covered under the Ten Commandments (since you say that “all moral actions do fall within their framework”) that help societies to survive?” Well, then what is a non-moral act? We know moral and immoral well enough by this scale, but non-moral is…what? An act that neither violates nor doesn’t violate the Ten Commandments? That would, of course, be incoherent. It forces us to ask, do non-moral acts not exist at all? Because certainly we can say that every act either does or does not violate the Commandments. But that’s another tautology. Or is a non-moral act one that is merely “passive” as regards the Ten Commandments? One that doesn’t actively violate any commandments, but isn’t supporting or involving any of them either? In that case, I think we can all think of examples. I’ll provide one: establishing a recycling center. Keeps the community cleaner, nothing to do with Gods, idols, murder, or coveting.
To review: You gave, in effect, two definitions of morality. One: “A true moral action will always ultimately serve the common good and, consequently, the ultimate good of the individual as well.” Well, it is certainly true then that acts that help society will always be moral, but it is also tautologous. But you also relate morality to the Ten Commandments, and say that all moral actions fall under the Ten Commandments. In what sense? And where does that leave non-moral actions? Either they cannot exist at all due to the nature of the argument, or they can exist rather easily and be helpful to society at that, so long as they don’t involve the Commandments in any specific sense.
Snurp:
I Have made a distinction between a moral standard, ie., the set of rules a particular society might say best serves them, a moral action, which observes the standard, and the principle, or concept of morality.
A moral action always ultimately serves the good of the many and the one, and falls within the framework of the ten commandments. If I may say so, these are merely two aspects of one definition.
I cannot see that there is any such thing as a non-moral action. Any action that is not immoral is moral.
Assuming your definition is true (your second paragraph), then indeed there is no non-moral action, as I said above. I’m rejecting your definition. I think Buddhism does fine as a moral policy, but it doesn’t accept the truth of or care much about Christianity. Same for many other non-Christian religions. Moral standards are, according to you, “the set of rules a particular society might say best serves them.” And what if those standards defy the first few commandments? What if they ask for acceptance of the Hindu gods? Or the spirits of a Native American tribe? Whatever Jesus’ thoughts on obeying the commandments were, the commandments themselves were quite explicit: “Do not have any other gods before Me,” for example. Are all acts that support and even defend the freedom to accept other gods immoral, because they allow and defend the breaking of the First Commandment? If so, then I get the feeling we simply have irreconcilable differences on what morality is, since our basic definitions cannot meet.
Snurp:
I will make one qualification to the definition I have given of a true moral action in that there is active moral behaviour, such as truthfulness and moderation in all good things, and passive moral behaviour; doodling, for example, or napping, neither of which does disservice to the community or to the individual, and neither of which opposes any of the ten commandments. Neither, I think, should any of it be in opposition to Buddhism.
“And what if those standards (’the set of rules a particular society might say best serves them.’) defy the first few commandments?â€
I’ve given the answer to this question, which I can only state from a Christian perspective:
According to Christ’s own teaching, come what may, we are free to submit or not, to the ten commandments in full or in part, by our own volition.
But I will add further, given that those commandments were issued to a people who acknowledged the source from which they came, as do Christians, I think we can assume that any others are not specifically subject to them.
Howdy all,
Mark L, I was only trying to clarify what I meant by subjective in my previous post. I didn’t provide any real points on why as I wanted to be sure that we both understood what the other was saying before really getting into the discussion.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Well, I didn’t come up with this idea myself, but it makes good sense to me. What do you think, Snurp, Simon?
In a discussion of Morality, I would say that anything that conforms to the Nature and Character of whatever has existed from eternity past (God, matter, or whatever) is “moral”, and whatever doesn’t conform, isn’t.
Simon:
“[S]ome agreement on guidlines of right and wrong among people and or differing societies” is what I mean by a particular moral standard, as opposed to the principle of morality. In saying that a set of moral guidelines can be subjective, I understand you to mean that one societies guidelines may not apply to, or adequately serve, that of another society. But may I suggest using the term variable, rather than subjective? Because standards of morality ought to be grounded in objective truth.
I think Simon would probably agree with me in saying that the criteria for morality which you give in 37 is…the precise way of putting it is difficult. Suffice to say it leaves something to be desired on my part. It leaves completely open the question of what it is that is eternal, and it seems to give some sort of moral status to the eternal, when a sceptic would be tempted to say that without people there is no morality, that morality is not eternal, and furthermore that calling something “eternal” may not be something we are qualified to do. It doesn’t seem like something you can really start a moral system with…at least, not one that you could get a good degree of agreement on without remaining unspecific and so ineffectual.
I think we’re going back to objectivity with this in a sense, and it seems once again to me like a conflict of definitions. What you see as objective is not what Simon or myself would see as objective. For you, objectivity seems to have a sort of ontological certainty; it is “Truth” with a capital T. I would, however, and it seems that Simon is not too far away from me so far, be more cautious and perhaps think of it as “truth” with a lowercase t. That is, perhaps we can get objectivity, but it’s objectivity in a certain sense, a sense unique to the human situation, where you are positing something much stronger, beyond the human situation and being a part of reality itself. Given a religious/spiritual outlook, I would say this makes perfect sense for you. However, I for one do not start from that viewpoint and am sceptical about “ontological capitalization” as a rule, so I am led in a different direction.
Snurp:
From the explanation in post 37, morality is based on whatever has existed from eternity past; that un-created, independent “whatever” that had no beginning, and which in itself, had to exist, unless one is ready to say that something can come from complete nothingness; no God, no matter…. And if someone is willing to say that then I would agree with Simon (and you) that it is at least questionable whether we have a beginning point for a discussion. It is for the individual to examine all the available evidence, to decide what sort of an eternally-existing entity makes the most sense, from what is observable in the universe and especially in all that makes up us human beings, including the concept of spirit. For me, the God described in the Bible makes the most sense of the the principle of morality and of the very existence and significance of human beings.
It does seem useful to capitalize certain words, Truth, Nature, etc., in philosophical/theological discussions; in the first instance, to indicate that truth is not random. But I need not capitalize the term objective in this discussion. Here, I use the term in a philosophical sense: that which must be unchangably true for everyone: “A†cannot be true and not true at the same time; God cannot exist for one, and not exist for another. Objective thought involves facts, subjective thought involves perception/opinion. There is no sense in saying, in ones opinion, murder, theft and adultery are immoral. Would you say that is not objectively true?
Once again, it depends on what exactly is meant by objectivity. In the sense of the fact that there are at most only a very few small societies that tolerate the acts you mention, that such acts are detrimental to societies as a general rule, and so that the prohibition of murder, theft, and adultery are considered wrong virtually across humanity (though, it should be noted, not completely across humanity) and that such a prohibition makes perfect sense then, then it certainly is objective. I can agree with that. There is a difference, however, between saying that and saying that murder, theft, and adultery are wrong in themselves, for the acts of murder, theft, and adultery are (to me) acts specifically defined by a human sphere of meaning. This is more the nitpicking of a philosophy student than anything else, really. To me it just sounds somewhat metaphysical, and as you can no doubt gather I am very sceptical about anything metaphysical. Something similar can be said about anything “eternal”: that is, it is beyond our scales, and whether there is an eternal or what its nature is is not so much the concern to me as what we can say about it, which I don’t believe to be much.
As has been said (not by me) it may be somehow conceivable that such acts as murder, theft and adultery are not considered socially detrimental in every nook and cranny of the world, but can it also be said that they serve the good of the individual? A moral standard ought also to protect the individual’s rights. Acts contrary to the principle of morality–murder in particular– whether included in any given standard of morality, deny significance to the individual.
It is the principle of morality (seated in the conscience) which tells us what actions, in themselves, are good and which are not, whether every society gives precedence to them or not. Slavery, to give an example, has always been wrong. This is why I say morality must have an objective, first-causal point of reference.
Ayn Rand, who as you may know, is an atheist philosopher, defines the term metaphysical as: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence. Do you find this to be a workable definition?
I agree that certain knowledge of anything eternal would be beyond the comprehension of anything that has come into being, until that which is eternal revealed itself to the other. And even then, certainly, that knowledge could never be exhaustive.
Howdy all,
You may have to forgive me a little on this post. I have yet to have my morning coffee so I may be a little more incoherent than normal.
Snurp has largely covered most of my thoughts on the subject so I will probably end up repeating a little of the conversation here. It seems to me that what people consider objective inthese debates differs vastly. I don’t consider morality to come from some external source. This is probably largely becuase I don’t believe in a God or Gods. I hold that morality is a concept created by the human mind and in that sense is subjective. As such morality as we dfine it only has meaning to ourselves, as humans.
I don’t believe that it can be conclusive proven one way or the other. At least not until the nature of morality is fully understood. I am certainly not at a stage where I have figured this one out. I lean towards the subjective idea in this case because I did not see an external source that could provide me with a definition of right or wrong that appeared completely consistent. Even when looking at the ten commandments I can envisage some situations that would break the commandments and yet would not be (at least in my opinion) immoral. Secondly the ten commandments do not cover a range of actions that I would consider immoral so it is not complete. I do realise that the bible does have a lot more to say on what is right and wrong however my objections to it providing a moral code stay largely the same.
Even if I supposed there was some external defined morality, there remained a problem. There was no way for me to know conclusively that, in the first that this objectively morality existed and in the second the exact nature of that morality. Therefore it seems to me that as I was forced to define morality myself any external definition was largely irrelevent and I end up with a concept of morality that is subjective to the human race.
I hope that in some way explains a little of where I am coming from.
“Because standards of morality ought to be grounded in objective truth.”
To me this would largely depend on what you define as an objective truth. If you consider the practical needs of living in a society and the simularity of those needs across different human societies as an objective truth, (Objective at least as it is consistant to humans) then there can be some agreement on moral guidlines. This for me is where the question of morality starts to become slightly murky. Without some agreed upon or accepted general idea of what is, globally considered morality, morality would have little or know meaning. However it would seem to me that there are plenty of situations that would fall outside of this and what people would consider moral would differ. This suggest to me that morality by necessity has a balance between the generally accepted ideals and the situation one is in.
I will leave it here for the moment as I think that I am getting to far into the subject. Beyond what we are discussing (so far).
Cheers
Simon Bond
Mere Morality: The Case for Christ…
…let’s assume that Lewis had succeeded. Let’s suppose that there is a God who created moral laws and gave us the ability to know these laws (conscience). Great, that means we can trust our consciences to guide us to do what is right. But this…
In response to Simon:
I had coffee his morning and a refreshing coastal walk this afternoon, so even if you find this a bit long-winded, hopefully, I’ll have no need to excuse any level of incoherence.
I think morality serves two essential purposes: first, to maintain a tolerable level of social order, which consequently is pleasing to God. I do not assume that the ten commndments were the first ever list of moral guidelines, but I would say that showing love toward ones neighbour as we love ourselves, just on its own, encompasses all good actions. And I’ll add that that commandment implies that we should love ourselves.
I consider it probable that the concept of morality came into existence when human beings first realized there might be a better way (than fighting) of resolving differences brought on by personal offenses enacted against them. And through talking over these differences rationally, came up with the idea to formulate standards of “socially acceptable behaviour,†thereby allowing individuals and groups to live together, as far as possible, in harmony. Granting this, we can say that morality came about as a result of intellectually observed facts about the human condition. This would require no direct divine involvement, but it would directly involve the individual conscience, which is what enables human beings to distinguish between what is morally right and what is morally wrong.
An objective perception of truth, according to The Ayn Rand Lexicon (of philosophical terms), means that reality is understood through observation; “good is an aspect of reality to be discovered, not invented.†God’s existence or non-existence is indepenfent of ones perception of the matter. A subjective perception holds that fixed truth does not exist; that truth (including moral truth) is only in the mind of the individual. Thus, by a strict rationale, the subjectivist can say: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!†Never mind that decadence and blood-llust may be the custom of the day. Never mind the notoriously anarchical rendering of street-gang jusice.
“This suggest to me that morality by necessity has a balance between the generally accepted ideals and the situation one is in.â€
Well, yes, war, in itself, is not a good thing, but just, unavoidable war, it my be said, is the lesser of two evils; the exact opposite of peace is not war, but willfully unprompted agression. To give a second example, some societies may, for various reasons equate betrothal or engagement with marriage.
What are considered moral priorities may vary (possibly even within the framework of the ten commandments) but what is moral in principle does not change. Murder, theft, adultery, lying, cheating, dishonouring ones parents, enmity toward a neighbour, in themselves, that is, for their own sake, are all unconditionally wrong. Objective truth says: with zero evidence, one can only say either God exists or he does not. And (for the sake of this discussion) if an eternally good God does exist, then blasphemy would be as morally wrong for anyone, whether one believed it or not. If such a God does not exist, where good and evil are held to be equal and oppisite forces, then it would seem to me, a despot is free to arbitrarily set up any standard considered servicable to any perceived ideals.
Hello MAPK L, Simon Bond, and Snurp,
I’m back and caught up with your discussion. It’s good stuff. It seems the debate has been over what, precisely, is meant by the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ with respect to moral laws. Allow me first to explain what I understand the terms to mean:
Objective Morality: Moral laws are universal and timeless; true for all creatures at all times. That makes them independent of any one individual, group, culture, species, and epoch.
Subjective Morality: Moral laws are dependent on at least one factor, such as individual, group, culture, species, or epoch.
The mistake I think MAPK L, and many make is a misunderstanding of the later. When they hear ‘subjective morality’, they immediately assume that means morality is dependent on the individual. It seems to me that some morality is subjective at the cultural and epoch level, still others that are subjective at the species level. In other words, part of our morality is universal to all humans throughout time, but not necessarily for some other sentient species. Since we are the only sentient species that we are aware of, those species-level, subjective moral laws would have the appearance of objectivity. This was the point I made in the original post.
I will nod approvingly to what sid has said and add that morality, even if it’s not objective in some sort of transcendent sense, can still be objective relative to us, that is to say something that humanity basically agrees on as being a worthy goal and way of living (of course this is no easy thing to do, but we can try). Technically subjective, but for any purpose that affects us objective. For even if there is no objective morality, a despot is not simply free to set up whatever tyranny he pleases; we’d like to have a word with him first.
As a side note, be careful how much Ayn Rand you use. I haven’t read much of her yet (I’ll get to it eventually), but they say she can ruin your brain.
And how! I’ve only read Atlas Shrugged (great book) and can point to a fundamental logical fallacy in her philosophy. Her writing is so compelling to the rational mind, that it’s tough not to become a Randroid
While murder and execution are both acts of humans killing humans, the latter can arguably be either right or wrong (morally just or unjust), but I fail to see how it could be argued that the former is not invariably (universally) wrong. From the viewpoint that truth is objective, not subjective, all morality, I would say, falls under what is objectively true. While the killing of humans by humans is wrong in principle, execution may be the lesser of two evils (not wishing to over-use the phrase). And giving precedence to the lesser does not involve subjectivity; it is rationally weighing, case by case, what will lead to the greater good.
History demonstrates that despotism qualitatively frees one to behave tyrannically, because tyrants don’t ask for approval of their methods of action.
Ayn Rand’s lexicon, for better or worse, is the only one I have at the moment. I’ve not heard such an opinion of her before, but would venture to say that “droidism†toward any philosopher may just as likely lead to mental ruin. And although I am in close agreement with rational objectivism, gos.sbc.edu/r/rand.html the Bible and Shakespeare are where I faithfully turn to find the truest rendering of the human condition.
Howdy all,
I think that Sid did make the point far more eloquently than I have. With respect to what Snurp said I am not sure that I entirely aggree. I would say that there needs to be a certain amount of aggreement to what morality is. However it is impossible (I believe) to come up with a set of moral rules that would cover ever single situation that any person may find themselves in. This may seem like nit picking but I do believe it is important.
There are a few concepts that spring to my mind here. How does one apply morality to those incabable of understanding morality. For example if you considers “honour thy father and mother” as a moral imperitive how is a newborn supposed to comply. Or for that matter somebody with a less than firm grip on reality. Perhaps we can also consider a person who doesn’t know who their parents are. What happens when that person meets their parents not knowing they are their parents and doesn’t like the sort of people they are. Is this immoral.
Even if I were to aggree that morality must be based on objective truth, what happens when a person cannot know what that objective truth is. Is it immoral to make a decsion to act in a certain way when you cannot know the whole truth. For example there is overwhelming proof that Mr Blogs is a murderer. The jury find him guilty and he was executed. Now let us assume that he was actually innocent. With no way for the jury to know this how do you determine the morality of their descision. Perhaps that is not a good example. What if he was merely sent to prison for life. If he was guilty would it be immoral not to perform some form of justice. If he is innocent is it imoral to imprison him when you cannot know for sure what the truth is.
Talking of truth there can be a difference in truth based on perspective. Consider to people sitting at opposite ends of a table. In the middle of the table is a salt shaker and a pepper grinder. These two items are lined up so that one is in front of the other from were the people are looking from. When asked “which is in front the salt or the pepper” person a replies “the salt is in front” person b replies “the pepper is in front”. Both statements would be true from the pespective of the person giving the statement and false for the other. The objective truth would be arguably that the slat is in front for person a and the pepper is in front for person b. If for some reason one could not obbserve the whole situation. Perhaps for some reason the two people and the observer could not see all of the situation. How does one determine the objective truth through observation.
In summary I suppose that even if objective truth and morality existed. It is not always possible to know what that objective truth and/or morality is. Therefore the model of morality we currently work from becomes more and more subjective as we define stricter and stricter definitions on what constitutes moral behaviour. As a species we cannot know the exact nature of everything people are likely to encounter. We can aggree or broad moral guidelines. But when we start investigating the specifics of certain situations people’s idea’s on what would and would not have been moral behaviour begin to diverge. Without someway of seeing the objective truth there is no way to conclusively judge which concept of moral behaviour is correct. This I believe brings in a certain amount of subjectivity to morality that cannot be resolved (yet at least).
Cheers
Simon Bond
Simon,
I’m not sure how much of that last post was referring to me, but I don’t think that there’s much of a conflict. I’ll clarify a bit.
“morality, even if it’s not objective in some sort of transcendent sense, can still be objective relative to us, that is to say something that humanity basically agrees on as being a worthy goal and way of living”
This should be taken as vaguely as it sounds. Of course there will be no universal agreement; that is pretty much a given seeing as we’re human. There may also not be a high degree of agreement, or a majority, or that much at all. If we can tolerate each other, that’s a start. We try to get better, but of course the goal itself and what makes something better in the first place are matters of dispute. But if and when we can get agreement on a way of living, we start making progress. And the more agreement we get, the further a given system expands, the more it takes on the image of objectivity. And when I say that something is objective for any purpose that affects us, it follows in line with what I just said above, basically.
Snurp, put in that light, I think we are basically in agreement then. Perhaps I should clarify as well. Only the first paragraph of my post was referring to what you said. The rest of the post was me thinking outloud about morality being based on objective truth.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Simon and Snurp,
Regarding your first question, Simon, I can only suggest that legal systems of justice, although they fail at times, are moral and, obviously, necessary. A jury performs its moral duty by pronouncing a verdict in accordance with the weight of the available evidence.
The salt and pepper brain-teaser does not defy objectivity when the whole question is presented: how are the two objects positioned on the table in relation to the observer?
Reason leads me to believe that a sense of morality exists inherently within the conscience of every human being. But I would say that moral accountability applies when the (sufficiently healthy) mind reaches a certain level of maturity; at which point the conscience “awakens.â€
“What happens when that person meets their parents not knowing they are their parents and doesn’t like the sort of people they are. Is this immoral.†This would relate to showing love toward ones neighbour as oneself.
“[T]hat is to say something that humanity basically agrees on as being a worthy goal and way of living.†The conscience applied to experience tells us what this is.
I see that my answer to the “salt and pepper” question calls for a minor, but important revision. How, by the compass, are the two objects positioned on the table? The answer, of course will be the same facing any direction at the table.
Howdy all,
Mark L, the purpose of the “salt and pepper” question is to demonstrate reference frames or perspective as it applies to truth. By equeating it to the compass you have utalised an agreed upon external reference. However that is not what the question asks. the question is designed to force one to use themselves (or their pespective) as a reference.
To put this accross into the innocent but convicted man. From the perspective of the jury there is no way to know for certain wether he is guilty or not. So for them the truth is he appears to be guilty. Or perhaps it is likely that he is guilty. From the pespective of the convicted man the truth is he is not guilty. I would agree that there is objective truth. At least if you mean something like the actual facts. The point I am trying to make is that it is not always possible to know the objective truth of a situation. Theorfore moral behaviour is defined by the truth from the involved pespective.
If you cannot know the objective truth it cannot be used to define your morality. If morality is defined by objective truth then it becomes impossible. Not impossible in the sense that one cannot try to be moral. Impossible in the sense that one cannot know what is moral.
In the case of our innocent man, I would say it is imoral to imprison an innocent man. However in order to decide on the morality of the jury you have to take into consideration their reference frame or pespective. They acted morally becuase they could not know that the man was innocent and the wieght of the evidence indicated his guilt.
Another way of putting it I suppose is, if one cannot know the objective truth of a situation, one cannot use it to define the moral course of action. Therfore the moral cousrse of action must take into account the perpective and relative truth of the person making the moral desicion. The morality of that desicion is then based on a relative truth and not a definitive one.
I can understand an argument that the general guidlelines of morality are based on objective truth as human’s understand it. I would still consider this to merely be a human perspective rather than an objective truth. It also would only give you a general idea of morally acceptable behaviour rather than a guide to specific behaviour in specific circumstances.
In summary morality needs to be based on each situation and what the person does know at the time they encounter that situation. Knowing including basic moral guidlines that they have been taught, what their conscience tells them, what information they know they don’t have, if it is likely that a reasonable reason for the situation exists ect. As we cannot always know the objective (or complete) truth of a situation we cannot use it to define what moral choice to make, or in the case of someone else what moral choice they should have made.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Howdy all,
Mark L, as I reread through the posts I noticed that I hadn’t addressed your comment.
“Reason leads me to believe that a sense of morality exists inherently within the conscience of every human being. But I would say that moral accountability applies when the (sufficiently healthy) mind reaches a certain level of maturity; at which point the conscience “awakens.—
I think I really have to give this one a little more thought. I think that for morality to inherently exist within the conscience you would have to demonstrate how it came to be. I think the conscience of a person is made up of many parts. Instinct, experience, empathy and reason just to name a few. I would also say that this conscience deveolps different from person to person. I doubt one is exactly born with a conscience. I would possible accept that components of it are inherently there. Looking from this perspective I would need some convincing that the conscience is a guide to the objective truth that defines morality.
If you believe in God and that he created us I could see how you can arrive at that conclusion. Further God does provide and explanation for morality defined from objective truth. As he knows everything he can use it to define morality. This however is where we reach an impass. As I don’t believe in God I am forced to define my morality differently. This is not to say that either way of defineing morality is better than the other. Merely that we approach it differently. I think it is more important to consider morality and continue to search for what is right and wrong than to prove that our approach is the correct one. I doubt any approach on this subject can be conclusively proven one way or the other.
Cheers
Simon Bond
Simon,
This particular discussion began with the question of whether morality is objective or subjective. And although it is tempting trying to prove ones own poisition, my primary purpose in any discussion, whether or not I acknowledge it readily and openly, is always to try to see truth more broadly and more clearly. I am in agreement with much of your final paragraph (post 56); how differing theistic views (legitimately) can affect our perceptions of morality, that the human conscience comprises instict, intellect, emotion, etc.
I’m still thinking over your previous post, and will try to answer in the next few days.
Simon,
The compass, as the objective external reference for the positions of the objects on the table, frees observers from a subjective point of reference. In this example, as far as I can see, the subjective answer is of little if any consequence, and for all practical purposes, really no answer at all.
It would be immoral, I believe, to put someone to death or subject one to life-time imprisonment, whether innocent or not, apart from some (as far as is possible) reliably-proven judicial system. But where a jury of twelve finds evidence of murder beyond any reasonable doubt, for the good of public safety, I think it would be immoral to err in pronouncing judgement on the side of the accused, even if, as on extremely rare occasions, someone is found to have been wrongly convicted.
Having the power of conscience means knowing the difference between what is objectively right or wrong, morally. And our means to knowing it comes through experience, through reason, tempered by feelings, I would say, and through teaching. I think the capacity for that knowledge is inherently human, but the acquisition of the power would effectively be dependent on having a sufficiently mature, healthy brain. Infants and the mentally defficient, therefore, would be exempt from moral accountability.