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Theologically speaking, I self-identify as a ‘deist-agnostic’, which really functions no differently than modern atheism. I live my life as if there is no God. So why even use the ‘deist’ label, why not just use ‘atheist’ or even ‘agnostic’? Sometimes I do. It depends on the situation, the audience, and the level of detail I feel like going into at the time. It’s impractical to list all situations where a theological label would come up, but I’ll give you a few. I’ll use ‘deist’ is social situations in which I know ‘atheist’ will cause unwanted trouble (I live and work in the Bible Belt of the United States). I use ‘atheist’ when discussing particular religions since I don’t believe in the god(s) of that religion. Also, I use the more precise ‘deist-agnostic’ when discussing theology and/or am interested in starting such a discussion.
My deist identity came up when discussing an interesting post about deism and skepticism with Thor’Ungal. I ended up explain the basis of my deism in light of my skepticism. The answer is the cosmological argument (CA):
1. A contingent being (a being that if it exists can not-exist) exists.
2. This contingent being has a cause of or explanation[1] for its existence.
3. The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.
6. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being that if it exists cannot not-exist) exists.
Notice the that the phrase “causes or explains” appears multiple times. That is because there are two primary versions of the argument that share the same logical structure. One is based on a cause-and-effect regression back to a First Cause (FC), the other, sometimes called the modal cosmological argument (MCA) is based on a regression of contingencies to a necessary being (NB). The former relies on the passage of time and is problematic for several reasons not least of which is that time itself may be a contingent thing. The latter doesn’t suffer from that weakness.
An example of a contingent being in the later framework would be matter. Matter could not exist without a space-time framework to exist within. Thus matter is contingent upon space-time, which in turn may be contingent upon something else. Tracing this contingency chain back must eventually lead to a necessary being. It only makes sense to call that being ‘God’. That’s why I can call myself a deist without violating my skepticism. The conclusion that God exists was rationally based – or so I thought…
Then I read Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion. He pointed out that an unjustified assumption in my reasoning had escaped my attention. I was presuming that when something is contingent upon another, the contingent thing must be the less complex object of the two. Thus, I concluded, the necessary thing must be the most complex thing in existence. I was wrong. Dawkins used his area of expertise, biological evolution, as a counter example to that very assumption. Simple can produce more complex.
Understanding this, I realized that all the CA concludes is the existence of a necessary being – a brute fact, as it’s been called. It doesn’t actually conclude the existence of God as commonly understood. While he makes this point very well, I think Dawkins goes too far in concluding that the NB must be simple. After all, the universe contains examples of complex-to-simple causation as well. Thus his extrapolation from one example, evolution, to the entire universe is unjustified. Furthermore, his argument only refutes the first cause version of the CA, not the MCA. This is because his counter example is time-dependent whereas the MCA is not.
Thus I see no way of knowing whether the NB is simple, complex, or anything approaching god-like. I remain agnostic on the subject. This completes my theological label of ‘deist-agnostic’. I have found no way of knowing anything about the necessary being. Not only am I ignorant of it’s level of complexity, but even if it’s complex, I have no way of knowing whether it’s worthy of worship, desires worship, or even if it has desires at all. Religions, of course, claim to know quite a lot about the necessary being. Based on what I know about those claims, I don’t believe them. Since I don’t believe in anybody’s concept of God, the label ‘atheist’ works just fine as well.
I don’t categorize myself when it comes to these things, so I am considered an atheist by many religious folk and deluded/irrational by folks like Dawkins (whose work seems completely pointless IMO). One cannot prove that God exists or doesn’t exist, and attempts to do either are supreme wastes of effort.
Anyhoo, I find more than one flaw in the CA.
#2 is not an absolute given. Maybe some things have no cause or explanation. Applying the scientific method, even rigorously, does not require this general assumption. Sure, in a specific experiment where you are looking for an explanation, you assume you’ll find one. But it doesn’t follow that everything has an explanation or cause.
#3. Mostly this is OK, but one could argue that since we do not have complete knowledge – and since we know that many superficially obvious truths are actually relative – this is not an accurate assumption either.
#4. Again, why must this be true?
#5. This one is totally false, isn’t even really arguable IMO
#6 and #7 follow from #5
Thanks for stopping by for a comment, Edward G. Talbot.
In my cursory treatment of the CA, I didn’t define ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’. Doing so addresses your objections. A contingent object is one that depends on the existence of an external object for its existence. A necessary object depends on nothing external for it’s own existence.
If you find an object as you describe in your objection to #2 – an object that requires nothing external for its existence, it doesn’t meet the definition of a contingent object, but of a necessary object. The same issue applies to #3. If an object relies on nothing external for it’s existence, it’s not a contingent being by definition. Thus numbers 2 and 3 are true.
#4 is also rendered true considering that the definitions of ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ things are complimentary. Not contingent implies necessary and visa versa. Thus a contingent being must rely on an external object which is one or the other.
#5 might be the weakest premise of the argument because an infinite regression of contingencies might be possible. In fact, this is one of the objections I make against the time-dependent version. But, with the modal version, I can argue that the regression taken as a whole is the necessary object. Why do you reject premise 5?
By the way, what genre would you say your novel, New World Orders fits into? I’ll eventually need a new podcast novel to listen to.
Hi Sid -
Ok, that makes more sense now that I understand it. I would then say that assumption #1 is false and therefore the rest of it has to be. There is not necessarily any such thing as a contingent being.
Now, maybe one could argue that any being with parents is a contingent being – I guess it depends on whether parents are an external object. But assuming that, then #5 is false -”Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.” Sure they can. My parents procreated, bam here I am. And yes, you might ask, but how did they exist? You could follow it ad infinitum. Someone who agreed with point #5 would say that at some point an ancestor had to owe its existence to something other than a contingent being. But that is an assumption, not a fact. If you cannot actually find a provable example of such a being and its external force, then #5 remains unproven.
New World Orders is a conspiracy thriller. It has some humor in it, as well as linking to recent and current events.
Edward,
I think that your objection in post 3 is what sid tries to address with the modal version of the cosmological argument. Not that I necessarily agree; in fact, I’m curious to hear a more precise explanation of this, as I don’t think I’m clear on it: “with the modal version, I can argue that the regression taken as a whole is the necessary object.” What about it is ‘necessary’? Is there a reason to call it such versus contingent or nothing at all (which is to say, we just don’t know and thus shouldn’t answer)? If the regression is necessary, what does that say? Can we justifiably call a regression of events an ‘object’? Can we say ‘regression’ without defaulting into temporal language? (‘Regression’ implies former and latter, after all; one can ask how this connects to temporality) Is there any sense in which a ‘necessary regress’ should be called God, god, or even an existing entity? I’m not clear on these matters yet, so we’ll see.
I have to run, so I can’t continue for now. However, I do want to ask one quick thing to sid: is the timing of this post chance or does it have anything to do with my statement of belief on Scott’s site?
Hello again Edward G. Talbot,
That’s an interesting attack. I’ve never heard of anyone refuting premise 1. It would invalidate much of the argument, but an simpler, alternative argument would suffice:
1. There are no contingent beings (your objection to #1).
2. At least one being exists (the universe, for instance).
3. All beings that exist are either contingent or necessary.
4. Therefore, a necessary being exists.
Same conclusion, different route. The universe as a whole may very well be the necessary object, the brute fact. The CA cannot escape that possibility.
If I understand you correctly, your objection to number 5 is that an infinite regression of contingencies could exist, requiring no necessary object. Again, I would reply that the infinite set that is made up by said regress is the necessary thing (that is, the set of all dependencies is not dependent on any thing external to the set for its existence).
Really postulating an infinite regress is over complicating the objection. We can consider just two co-contingent objects; two objects that depend on each other for existence, but nothing external from the two. In this case, we can consider the two contingent objects parts of a whole consisting of the two objects. Since the whole doesn’t depend on external objects for it’s existence, then by definition, it’s a necessary object. We could extend our co-contingent set to three, four, an infinite number of objects and the conclusion would remain.
Snurp, I too would be curious to hear more. I think you have it exactly right – why should we assume that the regression taken as a whole is the necessary object? A regression is not consistent with the definition of an object, IMO.
And. . .even if we granted the regression as an external object, it doesn’t in my mind meet the standard of proof. Sure, we all may think that there was an ancestor with an external cause, but again, that is an assumption. We’re saying “there must be” but we really don’t know. If we are going to attempt to use the rigors of logic to prove something thought to be unprovable, we must be equally rigorous in rejecting unfounded assumptions.
Hello Snurp,
Uh-oh, a highly trained philosopher has joined the discussion. I’m likely in for some trouble.
Our comments crossed paths, so I hope my previous comment helped clears things up for you. I’ll try to address some of your questions not covered in my previous comment.
Regressions need not be temporal. The example Edward G. Talbot made was temporal, but it need not be. It could be a regression of successively smaller parts. A molecule is dependent on it’s constituent atoms, which depend on their constituent protons and neutrons, then quarks then who knows what. It’s at least logically possible that the regression continues infinitely.
To succinctly address your other questions: Not one part of the hypothetical infinite set is dependent on anything outside the infinite set. Thus the infinite set is a necessary object by definition. Half the point of my original post is that even concluding that a necessary object exists, I do not know if it can properly be called a god. Finally, ‘object’ is a term I’m using as shorthand for the uber-generic phrase “thing that exists”.
Sid -
I would argue that an infinite regression doesn’t exist and is therefore not an object. It is simply a theory or a concept used to describe something that exists.
- Ed
There’s one thing that bothers me about this sort of argument that I’ve never really been able into words. I think I might be able to, or at least have a better chance. Now, sid, you say that, given the proof of the necessary being, you can’t say anything about the necessary being. I think this is right. But, I think that’s already saying too much. I think that there is too much metaphysical baggage in even saying the word “being.” Being implies a thing of some kind. We can refer to it as an “it.” It “exists,” and so on. When someone says being, there are a whole bunch of traits that go along, most probably not intentionally. The same comes with the word “necessary.” For example, say someone denies premise one (which, as we’ve seen, could happen). If he or she still admits that something, anything exists, then it must be necessary and the argument is won for the deist/theist. But something seems different about putting it that way. That way, the argument is basically, “Stuff exists, therefore God exists,” and that’s the extent of it. Technically, the implications are exactly the same: a necessary being exists. What the difference points out is that, just taken as “stuff,” the view of what is a necessary being shifts. It no longer seems “godlike.” I don’t mean this in a Judeo-Christian or any other sense. It can be as vague as you put it. But, even then, I think that in the conventional proof too much is unconsciously held, simply due to the way we use words. To say that, say, a regress of things is God, is to say, “stuff is God,” and nothing more.
Why does this matter? Because it changes the view of the argument and, with it, the argument itself. We are trying to prove something. If one are a deist, that thing is a god of some sort, however vague. But when one gets to this point, that stuff causing stuff is God, I think we’re reaching the point where it simply doesn’t make sense to call it God. Not just that God has become vague; discussion of God has become pointless in the strongest possible sense. There is zero connotation of God. “Necessary being” is even too much (I’ll get to being later). I think, if the argument is re-thought in a different manner, God drops out, and deism drops out with it. At least, that’s how I view it (and I am biased to atheism). In practice you seem to be the same, and you admit as much by being an “atheist in practice.” My only point is that in that case God falls on epistemological as well as practical levels.
Going back to the argument, one might object to premise one by saying that there are no contingent beings because there are not beings. In this argument “being” is a false designation applied to a non-existent thing in the sense that “human” describes a combination of things, but does not exist. In this case the process would go down ad infinitum. The problem with this is that it implies that nothing at all “is.” That’s tough to accept. At least, when you accept our language. But I think, as seen above, that our language implies more than we intend.
Also, in terms of the existence of a necessary being, it seems to me that the only reason provided to show the necessary being’s existence is the argument itself. I see no other reason to. In fact, to me at least it seems very counter-intuitive to believe that a necessary being exists, and in a way the argument implies this by starting from contingent beings, which everyone knows exists, and proving necessary beings, which are apparently what need to be proven. We have no experience of such a being that we know of. And really, how would one identify it? So, when given premise 4, either the infinite regress or the necessary being, I see no reason to choose the one over the other. The only positive reason given for accepting the necessary being is that it apparently completes the argument when the infinite regress does not. But that assumption depends on contingent beings being factually incapable of being an adequate explanation. As in, we know that it is impossible. I don’t think we do, so long as we cannot explicitly, beyond any possible doubt, deny the possibility of an infinite regress. If there is any possibility,even one beyond our knowledge, then we cannot confirm 5, and thus the rest does not follow. Premise 4 seems to confirm, or at least acknowledge, the possibility. Thus the argument does not prove. It demonstrates naught but possibility, and this is not known as the cosmological maybe argument.
Snurp. Totally agree with your analysis, with one very very minor quibble. I don’t think it is counter-intuitive to believe that a necessary being exists. It is perhaps not based in reason, but of course intuition is not reason.
Thanks, both of you for the discussion!
Right continuing from where we left off (http://podblack.com/?p=1167#comments)
This issue of contingency is getting me. I think some distinction needs to be made on the kind of things we expect to be contingent and what isn’t. For instance we expect that if things like protons are contingent then it follows that so are Atoms. If we are to even allow something intelligent as a necessary entity we should be aware of the implications. Unless we adopt a Dualist perspective (and the only even mildly sensible argument I have heard for it includes only experience and not intelligence) we must acknowledge that the only kind of intelligence we know of is comprised of parts. In fact even if we expanded it into the abstract and considered intelligence to be a kind of “free floating”??? Algorithm it still depends on the unthinking components of that algorithm. It would then follow that anything intelligent, or thinking, or feeling must be contingent on unthinking parts (even if they do defy any known limitations on physical objects).
I think this idea of top down design fails on the same grounds. Even a brute fact consisting of a complex object must be contingent on it’s parts. If we allow only non-contingent entities to be necessary entities then it follows that “God” or the necessary entity be both unthinking and simple (in fact ultimately so). This does not imply that we would understand this entity, but it would imply that it is unlikely to be anything like what we would call thinking or intelligent. It also does not imply that our universe wasn’t created by a God, only that if it were it was a contingent Deity.
This argument is also contingent on Dualism being false (which I personally think it is).
Awesome, looking forward to the reply
Thor’Ungal
Reality rocks, Every Day and in Every Way
Snurp,
We changed terms early in our conversation from God to the ground of all Being (recommend calling it GAB from now on). The arguement realy only implies this to be honest. That there be something that is a brute fact, even if that is just energy and a foundational Geometry.
My argument is more with what we would expect that thing to be. I think we can be more than purely agnostic on this. I don’t think intelligence can be non-contingent.
In other words GAB cannot be GOD.
Regards,
Thor’Ungal
I appreciate your candor and well thought through explanation and logical conclusions of your position on matters of deity. As a non-religious dogma free spiritualist Christian with a background in Zen and Taoism, I am not agnostic or atheist, but I disagree with most religious concepts of a “being” god, since the very concept of a eternal being is an oxymoron. Beings can be non-beings, therefore god cannot “be.” Buddhists do not believe in “a god” – but the EXPERIENCE of oneness, unexplainable, not logical, incapable of expression in thought or word, that is to say enlightenment, is an available state of mind wherein one can feel and know what it is that people try to explain as “god.”
RE: Snurp and Edward G. Talbot,
“There’s one thing that bothers me about this sort of argument that I’ve never really been able into words.”
I have the exact same feeling about the ontological argument. Perhaps I’ll post about that next and we can hash it out.
We are definitely brushing up against the limitations of language here. The word ‘being’ may very well carry implications not intended. ‘Object’, ‘stuff’, and even ‘thing’ do as well. Unfortunately, language is the best means we have of conveying meaning to one another.
I think you are right, Snurp. This is the part of the CA that I’ve been struggling with internally in recent months. Great, there’s a necessary being. But what does that mean? It seems it means so astonishingly little as to be a worthless concept. I’ve pretty much argued that if there isn’t a necessary being within ‘everything that is’, than ‘everything that is’ is that necessary being. I used to think of that as the difference between theism and pantheism. I’m starting to think it’s the difference between “there exists some significant object(s) upon which all else depends” and “stuff exists, but none of it is special.”
In summary, I’d say the MCA is sound (unless nothing exists, which I take as self-apparently false), but its conclusion is worthless. I’ll need some time to reflect before I convince myself that this is correct (or incorrect).
It does sound strange, when you think closely, to not only attribute existence to what exists (I am tempted to state Kant’s argument here that existence is not a predicate, but that would be outside the point) but to call what exists a “necessary being.” If what exists is a series of things, then the whole series of things is suddenly treated as a thing, to which the predicate “necessary” is attached in some sense. Is this legitimate? Can predicates belong to a chain of things? If one says that the chain is necessary because all its parts are necessary, one is saying that there are no contingent things, and thus denying premise 1 of the MCA (among other things). If not, then what is “necessary?” What is “the chain” as such, which is necessary in some sense beyond all of its parts individually or together? Can we even say with any real clarity what we’re referring to? It’s reasons like this that lead me to give serious doubt over to arguments about metaphysics, as they tend to require transcendence, so to speak, beyond the concepts themselves, some sort of step from words to reality that itself requires justification, but I’m not so sure can be justified.
This makes think that one of these days, sid, I need to get you into post linguistic turn philosophy, or at least some Wittgenstein. It’s difficult reading for the most part, but I think you’ll find a lot of interest in this area, and my background in this area is improving (also, they share a near-universal scorn for Heidegger
)
Marvin,
It sounds like you have an interesting perspective on Christianity. In what sense do you consider yourself a Christian? What do you think of Jesus, and of the gospels? Or is “Christian” more of a characteristic of your worldview, one component among others, so to speak?
Hello Thor’Ungal, and welcome to my blog. Thanks for sharing your thoughts!
If I understand correctly, your comment is not so much an objection of the CA, but a separate argument that the necessary thing cannot be intelligent. I am not a dualist and actually used a very similar argument in defense of monism in a previous debate. I’ve never thought of it in context with the conclusion of the CA.
I will note, however, that the CA doesn’t depend on dualism since the necessary being could be purely material. However it is true that in order for the necessary being to be intelligent, dualism must be true… or does it?
One of the most interesting arguments for God’s existence I’ve ever run across was that of George Berkeley. Part of that argument was an argument for monism. What’s different about his monism is that the one substance is ideas (or mind) and not matter. Matter only exists as an idea within our minds. If he’s right, then everything is, indeed, a top-down creation; minds creating matter for the mind to play with, so to speak.
This very argument is why I didn’t do well in the one philosophy class I took. It’s fun to read but after a while it seems that philosophers either a) end up with nothing existing or b) end up with something that eventually has no meaning. It’s like breaking down our language into phonemes, it all (in my mind) becomes meaningless noise.
Hello Marvin D Wilson,
Thanks for stopping by and dropping a comment.
“As a non-religious dogma free spiritualist Christian with a background in Zen and Taoism…”
Wow, that’s quite a mouthful. Like Snurp, I’d like to hear more about that. Interestingly enough, both Snurp and I tentatively planed on reading some Zen philosophy. What I know of it so far I don’t particularly care for, especially their implicit position that deductive reasoning is not valid, but it’s nonetheless interesting.
Still getting the hang of this blog, not sure if I’m talking to “Snurp” or “Sidwaifu” or if they are on and the same – lol. I am a Christian mostly because I had a powerful spiritual experience in which I met with the Christ. Jesus, the historical figure, I believe was a VERY high being. We all are “sons of god” so I don’t place any special significance on that designation of him biblically. He represented the potential in all of US. He in fact said, “Greater things than I have done shall ye do,” and also, “Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods?”
As far as the gospels, the ones in the Bible are wonderful, full of the living WORD, but there are many not included (for political reasons during Roman Emperor Constantine’s rule in the 4th century, he being a recent Christian convert trying to unify his country and get everyone to have one belief and dutifully pay their taxes), that are absolutely amazing. The Gnostic gospels, the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Gospel according to Thomas, the Gospel of Mary, the Gospel of Judas, to mention just some.
I’ve had enlightenment experiences practicing Buddhism, head banging and enlarging epiphanies studying Taoism and quantum mechanics, and a spirit to spirit encounter with the universal principle and power of the Christ. So while I profess Christianity, I do not exclude the study of or interaction with other faiths or followers or scriptures of those paths, NOR do I feel that agnostics and/or atheists are not spiritual – if they were not interested in spiritual growth/awareness, they wouldn’t bother to even talk about it or brand themselves as such as if to say, “No I don’t believe it. Prove it to me!” (smile)
Hey do you have a “follow this blog” gadget somewhere? I don;t see it, but would love to follow, stay in touch.
Woops, OK, I see now that Snurp and Sidwaifu are two different beings. Actually, deductive reasoning in Zen study IS of absolute importance. My Zen Master, Venerable Samu Sunim was hands down the most intelligent human I’ve ever encountered. He would go off on discourses expounding things that would leave me like, “Wha? Huh?” Then when he knew he had lost me he’d explain, logically, and bingo was his name-0. Brilliant thinker. Don’t know where you got that idea about no need for logical deduction. Lemme dig some and suggest some reading for you. will get back. No, reasoning has its place in Zen study, but it stops short of EXPERIENCE. Argue, debate and explain all you want, you do not BECOME a Buddha, you do not BECOME a Christ or a Krishna until you break through the barriers of the mortally bound limited thinking intellect. There is BIG mind, Universal Mind, the ONE that you and I are a part of. We are like waves in the ocean. We cling to our little individual wave as if that is “ME” – but eventually the wave hits the beach and “me” is no more. but nothing is lost or gained. The ocean is still there, has been all along. Trick is to be the ocean while still in your wave.
Thanks for the description, Marvin D Wilson. If you want to follow my blog, you can find my RSS feed through the ‘Subscribe’ link in the upper-left corner or through this link. I post a few times a month about various topics. Usually it’s about religion, philosophy, politics, or music.
It sounds like you practice the nearly-lost Christian mysticism. I’ve read a little about the early Gnostics and their ideas about “The Christ”. Given that flavor of Christianity, I can see how you can reconcile it with Buddhism.
I tried meditative practices back in college and didn’t find is spiritually enlightening in the least. When I read about experiences like the one you describe it always makes me wonder if the experience is genuine (a unique brain state which the preserver feels is significant) but the interpretation is not. Just about every culture has tales of such an experience and always put in terms of whatever happens to be their mythology. I’ve even had one such experience (which I’ll likely blog about later), but I don’t think it was God in any sense.
Edward G Talbot You lost me right out of the gate with”One cannot prove that God exists or does’nt exist and attempts to do either are supreme wastes of effort”
First of all one cannot prove a negative but it only takes one instance to prove the existence of something.Example one cannot prove that black swans do not exist but you only need to see one to prove they do exist.Black swans exist in Australia but beforehand no European had ever seen one.
The second point is if god cannot be proven or disproven by argumentation then why join in the conversation except to prove that even talking about it is fruitless?That sentence was a nice little hit and run which the others seemed to overlook
I am not trying to be testy just that the statement about not being able to prove or disprove something and the hopelessness of trying took me aback.
Could God prove his existence in an objective way or would we say if we saw a miracle happen that it was the result of a very technogically advanced civilization and how could we tell the difference?