Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
-Epicurus

As expected, I received multiple counter-arguments to my post about the Problem of Evil (PoE). Instead of very long comments addressing each counter-argument, I’ve decided to dedicate a separate post for each. That way, we can keep the various debates more organized.

This post is reserved for The Free Will Theodicy (FW).

For convenience, here is the formal PoE argument that we started with:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Like The Spiritual/Personal Growth Theodicy (SPG), The Free Will Theodicy is a rejection of premise 4. As with any of the premises, refute one, and the conclusion is not valid. The FW theodicy actually has a lot in common with the SPG theodicy. Indeed, the two counter-arguments are often conflated, as they were in Snurp’s initial comment. Both account for evil as tied to a greater good. In the case of the SPG, the greater good is spiritual and/or personal growth. In the case of the FW, the greater good is free will itself.

A distinction between the two Theodicies (and the reason they are distinct arguments) is subtle, but important. In the SPG, evil causes the greater goods, in the FW, the greater good causes the evil. In the former, the fact that evil was necessary turned out to limit the power of God. The latter doesn’t suffer from this criticism. Evil is the result of the exercise of free will. It doesn’t exist necessarily, but conditionally upon the free choices of autonomous entities.

The obvious rebuttal is to deny the existence of free will. Personally, I believe free will to be illusionary. We are machines complex enough to self-analyze, yet not complex enough to predict our own choices. Free will is a problematic philosophical concept in and of itself. While a debate over free will would be interesting, I’d rather not detract from the PoE. So, for the time being, I would like to debate the FW theodicy with the presumption that free will exists. I hope to return to the question of free will in a future post.

One thing is certain, though: free will is not absolute. There are many behaviors and thoughts we are incapable of controlling. When to feel hunger and whether or not to jump when we hear an unexpected, loud noise are just too examples. Also, we definitely have biological tendencies and predispositions. Can you really prevent yourself from becoming angry if you saw someone harming your loved ones? The fact of instincts, biological tendencies, and predispositions provides an open door for a rebuttal similar to the ones for other theodicies. Simply refine the PoE argument:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to minimize evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil is not minimized.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to minimize evil.
5. Evil is not minimized in our world.
6. If evil is not minimized and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to minimize evil, or doesn’t know that evil is not minimized, or doesn’t have the desire to minimize evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Given free will, we will commit some evil. Why do we choose to so often? Our instincts, biological predispositions, and predispositions play some roll in the answer to that question. God could have created us so that we commit less evil without a significant reduction in our autonomy. Suppose it was a little more difficult for us to feel anger and jealousy. That would result in some reduction of violence. We could still choose to do violence, it would just be more difficult and less likely.

Since God is omnipotent, we need not limit ourselves to tweaking our biology. He could make certain choices impossible to make on the side of evil. I thinking the really egregious stuff, like participating in a genocide. Would anyone complain of such a restriction of free will? I don’t believe the ability to choose to commit genocide is a greater good than eliminating genocide.

The debate over the DoE continues in the comments. I add an additional refutation in the first comment.

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
-Epicurus

As expected, I received multiple counter-arguments to my post about the Problem of Evil (PoE). Instead of very long comments addressing each counter-argument, I’ve decided to dedicate a separate post for each. That way, we can keep the various debates more organized.

This post is reserved for The Spiritual/Personal Growth Theodicy (SPG).

For convenience, here is the formal PoE argument that we started with:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The SPG counter-argument is a rejection of premise 4.

Snurp was the first to bring up the SPG (among other counter-arguments). Basically, it claims that some evil is necessary in order to promote a greater good. Enduring evil leads to spiritual and/or personal growth, which is a greater good than the evil endured. Thus God does not want to eliminate all evil because some of it causes greater goods.

The most common analogy I’ve heard to express this counter-argument is the parent analogy. God treats us like a loving parent treats his children. Protecting children from all evil and harm has a couple of negative effects. First, the children would not learn to appreciate good having never been exposed to evil. This would deny them important personal growth. Secondly, protecting them from evil and harm would ill prepare them for when they confront evil and harm when they grow up. You can read Snurp’s comment for another expression of the analogy and another analogy involving the government. Similarly, God allows us to experience evil and suffering for our own good.

One refutation is the same as for the Denial of Evil Theodicy. The PoE’s formal argument needs to be rewritten in terms of maximizing good instead of preventing evil.

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to maximize good.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when good is not maximized.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to maximize good.
5. Good is not maximized in our world.
6. If good is not maximized and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to maximize good, or doesn’t know that good is not maximized, or doesn’t have the desire to maximize good.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The argument is still valid and proponents of the SPG will now accept premise 4. In fact, that is the point of the parenting analogy: permitting some evil (usually in the form of suffering) is a means of maximizing good. So which premise is the SPG theodicy rejecting? Here’s the surprise, it’s premise 1. The SPG basically claims that God lacks the power and/or knowledge to achieve the greater good without using some evil. In other words, the SPG concludes that a God with limited power and/or knowledge exists. Once most religionists recognize this as the conclusion of the SPG, they abandon it.

The debate over the SPG theodicy continues in the comments. I have additional refutations in the first comment.

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
-Epicurus

As expected, I received multiple counter-arguments to my post about the Problem of Evil (PoE). Instead of very long comments addressing each counter-argument, I’ve decided to dedicate a separate post for each. That way, we can keep the various debates more organized.

This post is reserved for The Denial of Evil Theodicy (DoE).

For convenience, here is the formal PoE argument that we started with:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The Denial of Evil Theodicy is a rejection of premise 5. As with any of the premises, refute one, and the conclusion is not valid.

Snurp was the first to bring up the DoE (among other counter-arguments) and appropriately cited Augustine of Hippo. Basically he said that there is no real thing called evil, only degrees of good. The analogy for this I have heard is for dark and light. Dark is not an actual thing, merely the absence of light. Light, as we know, has intrinsic existence. We call them photons. What we see as ‘dark’ and light are really varying degrees of light. Similarly, what we experience as ‘evil’ and good are really varying degrees of good.

Snurp gives one rebuttal for the DoE. That rebuttal is actually an acceptance that premise 5 is indeed false as written and the the formal PoE argument needs refining:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to maximize good.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when good is not maximized.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to maximize good.
5. Good is not maximized in our world.
6. If good is not maximized and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to maximize good, or doesn’t know that good is not maximized, or doesn’t have the desire to maximize good.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The debate over the DoE continues in the comments. I add additional refutations in the first comment.