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Over the course of my time contributing to ReligiousFreaks.com, I got to know a fellow blogger, Scott. You can learn more about him on his own blog, Spiritual Tramp. We decided that it would be interesting to enter into a debate on the abortion issue. He was kind enough to host the debate and to allow me to repost it on my blog as well.
We chose to begin my limiting the scope of the debate to the morality of abortion, and not the legality. We each began by independently writing an opening piece describing our position on the issue. From there, we took turns responding to each other’s arguments. You can comment on the debate and the topic here. Scott’s opening position begins this debate:
Abortion – Moral or Immoral
The morality of abortion is an incredibly tough nut for me to crack. Much of the discussion typically involves things like the nature of life, what it means to be a human being and when it should be permissible to take a human life. Those are all complicated things to be sure and I shall try and illuminate each point to lay out why I believe abortion to be by and large an immoral choice.
To my way of thinking life is a sacred thing. Everything that has life on this planet ultimately comes from God. He created the universe and all of its parts. As such, his fingerprints are on everything, living and non-living. When he was done with the work of creation he gave humanity dominion over it and charged us with taking good care of it. That charge carries with it a great deal of responsibility. Now of course as limited creatures we can’t control everything, but where we can we should exercise great care with the resources available to us. I think that’s especially true where living things are concerned, since as yet we have only a very limited ability to return life when it has been taken. That’s true whether you believe in a higher power or not.
A huge part of this discussion needs to be about when a person becomes a person. What you usually hear from my “side”, the religious camp, is that personhood starts at conception. On the other hand, the pro-choice side often refers to an unborn baby simply as a fetus. While of course that’s an accurate word for what it is, it seems to me to be an effort to control the language. Of course the pro-life camp does that too (I believe the current term is pre-born) and I don’t think that either approach is beneficial to the discussion. What I do know is that science is consistently pushing back the date at which a viable birth can occur. Currently the earliest point at which a baby is considered viable is twenty-three to twenty-four weeks. The jury’s out on whether or not it feels pain. We can’t be entirely certain what (if anything) is going on in the mind of that child. But to look at it and decide that it doesn’t have a right to live is, one would hope, difficult for everyone involved. When I see pictures of a baby at that stage I see a human baby, not a fetus. I won’t argue that a blastocyst should necessarily have the same rights that I believe a baby at say twenty weeks should have, but if an abortion were to be considered after the first trimester it would raise red flags for me.
And as human beings, I believe that we are the pinnacle of created life. I suppose that sounds more than a little arrogant. After all, we occupy only a very small part of the universe and there may well be thousands of other creatures out there far superior to man. But it’s hard for me to make assumptions based on things that may of may not exist. According to my faith, something that informs everything I do, the idea of man as the ultimate creature is central. We are told that we are created in the image and likeness of God. I don’t think that this particular debate should get sidetracked on to whether or not that means that God looks like the stereotypical old man with a beard, but to put it succinctly I don’t believe that that is what it means. What that means to me is that we are the most like God of any other creature. That lends a great deal of value to all human lives, a value that I personally believe to be equal across the board. No one human is more intrinsically valuable than any other. Of course one of the wars that man has fought throughout history is that very one. Some men see themselves as superior to others. Slave trade is based on that idea. My ancestors didn’t believe that Africans were actually men. For me it’s not all that big a leap to the pro-choice lobby which seems to be pushing the idea that the fetus isn’t really human. Therefore what you’re aborting has no value, or at least less value than the mother. I have a big problem with that.
So for the most part I believe that abortion is immoral because what you’re doing is taking the life of a fellow human being. One who has no ability to defend themselves and who has no say in the matter. This is a person, created in the image and likeness of God; a person who is filled with potential, good and bad, and who should have the opportunity to live that potential out. As true as that is though, I also believe that there are times when it is morally acceptable to take the life of another. Such a choice should always be difficult, though at such times one rarely has the luxury to sit and contemplate. The seemingly obvious instances would be when the mother’s life is in jeopardy, when the baby is extremely ill, and in cases of rape or incest. The more I think about the last two, the less moral those decisions seem to me and I hope to put “feet” on that as this progresses.
Abortion – Morally Permissable
Scott and I have decided to enter into a civil debate over the abortion issue. I don’t often willingly debate this issue because I recognize the strong emotions held by both sides and I strongly dislike emotional arguments. I have agreed to debate this issue with Scott because I respect his rational approach to Christianity and believe that both He and I will be able to (mostly) keep our emotions at bay. Also, since I do not hold any of my beliefs dogmatically, I find it quite likely that I will learn something about the issue from Scott and hope that he may learn something from me. I’d also like to thank Scott for the invitation to debate and for setting up the forum on which the debate will appear.
I would like to start by stating that I find this issue to be ambiguous, morally speaking. I recognize that both sides of the issue have legitimate points that deserve careful consideration. Scott and I have agreed to start with debating the morality of abortion first and not to discuss the legality of the issue until later. We will both write a short essay (this being mine) defining our respective positions and then enter into an on-going debate via the forum.
When it comes to actions, I have four categories of morality: morally neutral, morally wrong, morally permissible, and morally right. Morally neutral actions are those that are irrelevant of moral consideration; e.g. deciding what color shirt to wear today. Morally wrong actions are those which are wrong in all or most circumstances, e.g; murdering a person. Morally permissible acts are those where the morality of the act heavily depends on the circumstances. Lying is one such act. Lying in an attempt to get an internet user’s username and password to a bank account is wrong, lying when asked if you like your coworker’s new shoes is neutral, and lying to protect the identity of a witness to a gang murder is good. Lastly, morally right actions are those which involve some form of self-sacrifice for the betterment of others. Volunteering at a homeless shelter is an example.
My position is that having an abortion is a morally permissible act. It falls into that morally ambiguous zone where circumstances weigh heavily on the judgment of the action. In order to defend this position, I must describe the underlying moral reasoning that led me to this conclusion. This will be a roundabout journey, but I will eventually apply the following reasoning to the abortion issue. I believe that a utilitarian theory of morality, similar to that of Peter Singer’s, is the best approximation we have to moral truth. Under this theory, the moral value of an action is based on the amount of suffering that results or is alleviated from that action. Furthermore, the amount of suffering is weighted by the level of personhood those effected possess.
It is on the topic of personhood that I expect much of the debate to take place. The reason is because it is likely the dividing line between my world view and that of religious people. For this reason, I should define ‘personhood’ carefully. Personhood is the extent to which a being is able to sense the world, react to it, think, and reflect on their actions. Under this definition, a rock has no personhood, a plant has very little personhood, and most human adults have a very high degree of personhood.
How does the degree of personhood relate to suffering? Well consider cutting off a part of a creature and consider how it affects objects of varying personhood. Clearly, cutting off a piece of a rock causes no suffering. Also, though cutting off a limb of a tree causes the tree to ‘suffer’ in the sense that it is less able to feed itself through photosynthesis, there is absolutely no awareness of this loss. Similarly, pulling off a leg of a beetle probably causes some pain, but there is likely no real awareness of that pain and certainly no on-going suffering for the beetle. Next consider cutting off a limb of a cat. Certainly, the cat suffers both from the pain of the removal and the on-going pain of not being able to do all those behaviors cats love to do. The cat’s higher level of personhood increases its suffering. Compare this, now, to the suffering of a fully grown and fully capable human that loses a leg. The pain of suffering the wound may be comparable to that of the cats, but the suffering is intensified by the human’s high level of personhood. A person would be all too aware of the implications of loosing that limb. The person would know that he or she are now limited in his or her choice of occupations, hobbies, and even modes of socializing. The person would likely consider it more difficult to find a mate or raise children. And, perhaps worst of all, the person’s high level thinking and self-reflection is capable of imagining ‘what if’. He or she could reflect on what life could have been like, if he or she had never lost that limb. Self-reflection makes some self-pity almost inevitable, even if temporary. In this sense, personhood amplifies suffering.
Also, differing degrees of personhood exist within one species, specifically, ours. Here is where my morality runs smack into divine command theorists. Most religious people consider all humans to have identical inherent value regardless of their developmental status. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘sanctity of (human) life’ position. In contrast, the ‘degree of personhood’ utilitarianism admits that not all humans have the same level of personhood and are thus capable of differing degrees of suffering. Consider someone in a persistent vegetative state. How does this individual stack up against the definition of personhood? Sadly, not very well. The individual might be able to sense the world around him/her to a limited extent, but that individual’s ability to interact with the world is severely curtailed. And to the best of our knowledge, such an individual is incapable of any meaningful thought and self-reflection. We can see the individual’s diminished state of personhood illustrated by his/her diminished ability to suffer. Consider if a terrible accident severed this individual’s leg. Sure, he/she might feel the pain but would not have the additional suffering of reflecting on the life-changing implications of the loss.
So how does all this apply to the abortion issue? Well, as with any action, under this moral theory, one must consider the amount of suffering caused by taking that action. Also, when performing this moral calculus, the suffering of each individual must be modified by the individuals’ level of personhood. With an abortion decision, the two most impacted entities are the mother and the fetus. Clearly, the level of personhood is much higher in the mother than in the fetus. Thus the suffering of the mother takes on much more importance when evaluating the morality of an abortion. Even if a fetus is capable of feeling pain, it certainly cannot fathom the implications of the abortion. On the contrary, the mother is fully aware of the likely results of her decision. It is the amplifying effect of personhood on suffering that permits the mother’s interests to trump those of the fetus.
As I wrote towards the top, this moral theory is not perfect, only a good approximation. I am fully aware of some of the problems with this type of utilitarianism, some of which I’m sure we will discuss. It does seem like a good place for me to start the discussion. Lastly, it has been a very long time since I’ve rigorously described these ethics. I wrote this entire essay from memory without any research. I politely ask to reserve the right to modify this theory as I research during the course of the debate. I eagerly await Scott’s response.
Response to Abortion – Morally Permissable
Sid, you defined personhood as “the extent to which a being is able to sense the world, react to it, think, and reflect on their actions” and say that as a result we can wind up with different degrees of personhood. That’s internally consistent and I see how you arrive at that. Culturally though it would seem that this definition doesn’t hold up. In our culture and indeed in most cultures that I’m aware of, children are considered precious. When you rescue them you are deemed heroic, more so than if you helped say an able bodied adult. The same can be said of the elderly, even those that can no longer care for themselves. I am encouraged to think of those beings as something to be protected. Similarly, harming animals and insects, depending on the motivation, can be considered an immoral act so I would think that the mother’s motivation for the abortion must be called into play. The amount of “personhood” something has should not be the sole measuring stick for considering the morality of the act against them.
Secondly, your statement that “Clearly, the level of personhood is much higher in the mother than in the fetus” is certainly clear to you, but less so to me. I understand how you’ve defined it, so that’s not where my issue lies. It’s more the conclusions drawn from that that bother me. The mother in most cases chose to engage in behavior that would bring another person into being. In the instance where she makes the decision to terminate her pregnancy in later stages, I can see how thinking of the baby as a lesser person, not as capable of feeling pain or understanding suffering as she is, would be comforting to her. But to take this sort of thinking to what I believe to be its logical conclusions would mean to think of anyone with a lower IQ as less human or anyone who is quadriplegic to be of a lower level of personhood (not views I hope that you hold). I’m certainly not attributing this belief to you, but thinking like this strikes me as something of a slippery slope. We can’t truly understand what thoughts are going through a baby’s mind and the only ways that I can think of for us to know the level of pain something is undergoing would be immoral in this case. As I understand it, Peter Singer has some very controversial beliefs that have come out of this belief system that bears my belief out. This sort of thinking can lead to a level of infanticide and euthanasia that I think even Singer would be uncomfortable with.
I think that you also need to consider potentiality. In a human child there are untold amounts of potential and to decide in the now that this being is not as much of a person as I am seems ultimately self centered. I understand that Singer doesn’t consider that to be important, but bear with me. Much of our legal system considers potential to be very important when it comes to human life. If I rob someone of a part or the rest of their life then the punishment for that act assumes that the person would have continued to live as they had done before for the life span of an average human being. I know that we’re not talking about legality yet, but hopefully you can see what I’m getting at. I don’t think that potential can be ignored.
The question I put to you is at what point does the life of the child gain its own importance? I agree with you to a degree. Until the child is able to survive “on its own” say at around twenty-three weeks, abortion in my mind could be considered moral, again depending on motivation. Does motivation play into your thoughts at all? Is it moral for a mother to abort just because she doesn’t feel like carrying to term? Say she makes this decision late in the third trimester. So many questions.
Sid’s 1st Rebuttal
Hello Scott,
For simplicity’s sake, may I refer to your position as the Sanctity of Life Ethic (SLE for short)? I’ll use that title in this counter-rebuttal and replace it with a title that you prefer if necessary. You may refer to my position as the Quality of Life Ethic (QLE), if you’d like. I will first critique your opening position and then move on to your first rebuttal.
Your opening position was a very interesting read. Contained within it, I found implicit support for the idea of degrees of personhood within the human species, but I’ll get to that later. As with many ethical debates, terminology discussions become unavoidable. While I agree that we should not attempt to control the language, it is important to clearly define some of the important terms. The central term to the SLE is ‘human’. Most who adhere to the pro-life position define human as any living organism with complete human DNA. Under that definition a human begins to exist at the moment of conception. I actually agree with the pro-life’s definition of ‘human’. What I disagree with is that all humans have the same intrinsic value and the same rights. It is for this reason that I prefer the term ‘person’, as I have defined it, to ‘human’. The use of the term ‘person’ also avoids the anthropomorphic arrogance that you mentioned; it admits to the possibility of the existence of people who are not human.
Your opening position suggests that you agree that conception is not the appropriate place to draw the line: “I won’t argue that a blastocyst should necessarily have the same rights that…a baby at…twenty weeks should have.” My question for you is what criteria would you suggest we use to determine when a fetus earns a right to life? Based on your statement, “we are the most like God than any other creature. That lends a great deal of value to all human lives”, the criteria seems to involve how ‘God-like’ a being is. When you say that humans are ‘created in the image and likeness of God’, you seem to mean that we are like God in the sense that we can think, reflect on those thoughts, and morally judge our own and others’ actions. If it is in this sense that we are God-like, than ‘God-likeness’ is very similar to my definition of ‘personhood’. Also, it is clear that not all individuals are like God to the same degree. It would be ridiculous to claim that God is as much like a brain-dead individual as God is like you or me. Furthermore, under any reasonable and non-physical explanation of how we are like God will admit that there are degrees of God-likeness or personhood within our species.
Your first rebuttal was well written and brought up some very interesting and important points. To start, let me remind you that personhood is not my ‘sole measuring stick’ for moral consideration. It is only a modifier within my QLE framework; the ability to suffer plays a primary role. My main point was that one’s degree of personhood often affects one’s ability to suffer, which is why it needs to be taken into account. Thus only differences in personhood that effect suffering are important in drawing ethical distinctions.
Considering this clarification, your objection based on the reduced personhood of people with lower IQ or physically disabled is addressed. The differences between a physically normal person and a quadriplegic person have no impact on their ability to suffer. Therefore, they both are entitled to the same moral consideration. The same is true for IQ differences. Unless someone’s IQ is severely impaired, the person’s ability to suffer is not affected.
Another object to the QLE that you present is that our culture values saving the lives of children and elderly over saving the lives of able bodied adults. This seems to suggest that we intuitively value the lives of those will less personhood than those with more. I would argue that what we really value is the person’s willingness to save those unable to save themselves. What we are doing as a culture is relying on intuition that approximates a complex moral calculation. On average, those with high degrees of personhood are more likely to be able to save themselves. Thus we reserve greater praise for someone who doesn’t waste effort saving an individual with a high chance of survival and instead spends that effort saving someone with a lower chance. The net effect on a grand scale is that more people survive.
Another of your objections has some validity. A reason that we might value the life of a child over the life of an adult is because the potential personhood a child possesses. This is the argument from potentiality. This argument states that a fetus has the potential to become a full person, thus a fetus/unborn child should have the same rights as a person. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it can be used to justify giving fewer rights to beings as well as more. I have the potential to become a corpse, yet no one (I hope) would claim that I should have the same rights as a corpse! Clearly one’s potential cannot be the only criteria on which we grant moral worth.
Despite this problem, I think that potential personhood must play some role in the calculus of the QLE. On this, we agree. The problem is determining what role. Any inclusion of potential must be modified by the probability of achieving that potential. For this reason, I would agree that a blastocyst shouldn’t receive the same moral consideration as a third trimester fetus/unborn child since the blastocyst has much lower of a chance of realizing its potential personhood. As a result, actual personhood should receive more consideration than potential personhood. Thus even with taking potentiality into account, a mother’s suffering carries more moral weight than that of her fetus/unborn child.
Does motivation play into my thoughts? The simple answer is yes. It matters in its relation to suffering, of course. I’ll give an example in relation to abortion. Consider two expecting women. Woman A suffers from minor but chronic back pain while pregnant. Woman B suffers from brittle bone disease. Carrying a child to term would be extraordinarily painful and would likely cripple her permanently. These two women would have very different motivations for having an abortion. Clearly having an abortion would reduce the suffering of woman B far more than it would for woman A. Therefore, woman B has far more moral justification for an abortion than woman A. Is it morally permissible for mother A to have an abortion? Well that leads to your other question…
At what point does the life of a fetus/unborn child gain its own importance? Well, the moment it can suffer. The real question is at what point does the fetus/unborn child’s potential personhood carry as much weight as the mother’s suffering? It depends on the level of suffering. I think that the mother is best able to answer the question. She is best able to determine her own level of suffering and thus has the most information to perform the moral calculus.
I eagerly await your response.
Scott’s Response
I really need to come up with catchy/significant titels for these posts. Anyway, here’s my response.
SLE vs. QLE is good enough shorthand. You asked what criteria I would suggest we use to determine “personhood”. For purposes of this discussion and to avoid this blowing up into a debate that involves euthanasia (though that could certainly be grist for future mills here) I would say that at the point the fetus becomes viable outside the womb is the point at which it has the rights of a person. Before then, which as best I can tell given current levels of technology is twenty-two to twenty-three weeks, I still believe that it is a person, but it becomes more difficult for me to tell someone that they are committing an immoral act in having an abortion. When a mother loses her baby naturally at a very early stage I would perfectly understand them mourning the loss. So I do believe that conception is the point at which life begins, but while they are completely dependent on the womb environment the rights of the mother take precedent. During that time it is as much a part of her body as any other. Once it is capable of independence, it should be granted that possibility.
When I talk about us being created in the image and likeness of God, I don’t necessarily mean that the more like God one is the more of a person they are. Considering I believe that God is so much more, infinitely more than we are, we can’t approach what God is. As such I don’t think that an adult is more like God than a child or if they are then it’s a matter of an infinitesimal difference. It comes back to that matter of potential, I suppose. In regards to a brain-dead individual, I would say that they are not like God of course since they don’t even have the potential to reason, emote, etc. So for me at least, one is either a person or one is not, there are no degrees per se.
So speaking of that let’s talk a little about potential. You talk about the likelihood for that argument to grant us fewer rights. After all, you say, you have the potential to be a corpse. I’ve often heard this brought up and I’d say that’s not a potential, that’s a certainty. In our culture even corpses have rights, but no one argues that you should have the same rights as a corpse, because a corpse is not a person. No one argues that they are, so this strikes me as a bit of a red herring. Now if the corpse had potential to become a person I could see an argument for giving corpses the same rights as a person, but not the other way ’round. In my mind a fetus is a person, so the potential is not the possibility that they will become a person. It’s not a serious state change (dead to alive), but the idea that given time they will come to be someone just like you or I. It’s a matter of degrees. Even if that baby will come out with Down’s Syndrome, that doesn’t mean that they lose the chance to experience existence as best they can. When you say a” blastocyst has much lower of a chance of realizing its potential personhood”, I assume that you’re talking about statistical chances. For me that doesn’t really enter into the equation. I always try to assume what the best case scenario would be when I make a moral decision. If there is any chance that the baby can come to full development, then it should be allowed to. Of course things are never that simple and if, as in your examples of woman A and woman B, there is near certainty that it would cause a great deal of harm for a woman to carry to term, I think it would be morally permissible for her to abort so long as she did it early on. Of course, in my opinion it would be better for her to take every possible precaution not to get pregnant including, but not limited to sterilization.
I’d be interested in hearing more from you concerning the idea of suffering. What does it mean to suffer? Is it strictly speaking mental? If I were to assault someone who was unable to feel the pain physically, but was still mentally acute or vice versa is this different morally from assaulting someone who had all of their faculties? And while the mother can certainly determine her level of suffering, how certain can she be of what level her child is capable of? Should she always assume that her level would outweigh that of her child’s? I can’t help but think that this sort of reasoning could extend beyond the point of a child being born. If a two year old is causing their mother to suffer, should the mother be allowed to take extreme action to end it? And then you need to examine the mother’s ability to ascertain their own level of suffering. A fourteen year old doesn’t usually possess the tools necessary to make that assessment. Given that, would it be moral for a teenage mother to abort? So this adds another question to our discussion. It’s not just, at what point is it no longer moral to abort given the baby’s level of development, but also at what point does a mother lose or gain the ability to make that decision?
Sid’s 2nd Rebuttal
If I understand you correctly, you are claiming that personhood, in practice, is a binary variable; either one is a person or one is not. You deny meaningful degrees of personhood because your basis of comparison, God, is infinite. Since God has so much more personhood than anyone else, the minor difference in personhood between two humans is negligible.
But if we follow this reasoning a little further, I think we will reach a conclusion unacceptable to both of us. We would be forced to equate our personhood to that of a dog, for instance. After all, when we consider the difference between our personhood and a dog’s, it is nothing in comparison with God’s infinite personhood. Denying degrees of personhood between humans based on comparison with infinite personhood also denies degrees of personhood between species. A proponent of SLE would be forced to conclude that humans are not deserving of any special moral consideration based on our likeness to God. I assume that you do not agree with this conclusion thus you must accept that the premise is faulty. Therefore meaningful degrees of personhood (or God-likeness, for the religiously inclined) exist between some humans.
You do have a valid point in your rebuttal to my ‘potential corpse’ reasoning. The state-change from living to dead is (often) such a drastic difference that moral comparisons may not be applicable. Still, the argument for potential can be used to justify the restriction of rights. All of us have the potential to become senile, yet no one claims that we should have the same rights of the mentally incompetent. Again, I can see potential playing some role in moral considerations, I just don’t know exactly what it is and am hoping you can shed some light on this.
This leads me to another train of thought. I’m confident that you would agree that one who is senile is still created in the image and likeness of God (a person), yet we don’t grant them the rights of a mentally capable adult; the power of attorney, for instance. Nor do we grant equal rights to children based on their potential to become adults. If not degrees of personhood, what criteria are you using to justify the differing moral rights?
You legitimately ask me to define my use of the term ‘suffering’. Since my QLE is rooted on this concept, I should have carefully defined it at the outset. Suffering occurs when any entity cannot fulfill any of its interests. Anything that lives has an interest in not dying, anything that can feel pain has an interest in not being in pain, anything that is hungry has an interest in feeding, etc. An otherwise normal person who cannot feel pain has only one less interest than the rest of us, that individual doesn’t have an interest in avoiding pain. He/She will still have an interest in avoiding injury, scars, bruises, wasted time, the emotional impacts of being a victim, and so forth. Thus assaulting this individual would only be marginally less immoral than anyone else.
Another question you asked is how a woman can determine the level of suffering her fetus is capable of. Well, we need to take into account the varying interests at play here. As a living thing, a fetus has an interest in living and, after a certain amount of development, a fetus has a central nervous system and has an interest not experiencing pain, but that seems to be the extent of it. I know of no evidence of any other interests of a human fetus. An adult woman, by way of contrast, has both of these interest plus many more, such as an interest in avoiding the pain, expense, inconvenience, emotional hardships, and health risks of childbirth. Her multitude of interests trumps those of the fetus.
Using this version of the QLE, it is easy to see why a woman’s prerogative does not extend to after the birth of the child, at least not in our modern society. The main suffering a postpartum mother would experience result from the on-going care of the infant. Infanticide is not justifiable because our society provides an alternative that does not infringe upon the infant’s interest in survival and does not require the mother to assume additional suffering; adoption or foster care. There is no question that these options are morally superior to infanticide since they reduce the suffering experienced by the infant without significantly increasing suffering for any other person. For this reason, post-birth is the rational point to grant a human a moral right to life.
After Much Consideration…
aka laziness, I think I’m ready to respond.
Regarding our personhood in relation to God, maybe an analogy will help. I create a clay sculpture in my image. Some are larger, some are smaller. I consider all of them to be in my image. I also create a wooden toy dog. This is not in my image. So it is with God. He created us “in His image and likeness”. Now, I don’t believe that that means God looks like us or vice versa. I believe that it means that we have certain qualities that God has. Call it a divine spark or the breath of life. It is this thing that differentiates us from the animals. It is perhaps the Ultimate Potential. It’s what makes us creative beings. It’s what drives us to philosophize, write poetry, examine the universe, etc. These things are unique (afaik) to humans. We all realize this potential to various degrees based on our own stage of development. Some never get the chance, but that doesn’t make them less human. A dog or a chair or a rock never has that potential. Does that make sense?
So I think I’m still on sold ground for saying that in the SLE there are no meaningful degrees of personhood. All human life is sacred, even that of a murderer on death row.
You go on to say:
This leads me to another train of thought. I’m confident that you would agree that one who is senile is still created in the image and likeness of God (a person), yet we don’t grant them the rights of a mentally capable adult; the power of attorney, for instance. Nor do we grant equal rights to children based on their potential to become adults. If not degrees of personhood, what criteria are you using to justify the differing moral rights?
So given what I said above, both the senile and the young have a right to live. “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” are among the inalienable rights that the DoI says that we have. I suppose we have branched out from the right to simply exist as a person to other rights, which makes this more complex. For these other rights then it becomes not about someone’s personhood, but about qualities that a person has, maturity, intelligence, etc. This gets to how that potential is realized. In my opinion this doesn’t make someone more or less deserving of life itself. It only limits how they may express that life, or live it out. The right to power of attorney or to go buy a beer or those sorts of things isn’t inalienable in our society.
Given that, when you say “An adult woman, by way of contrast, has both of these interest plus many more, such as an interest in avoiding the pain, expense, inconvenience, emotional hardships, and health risks of childbirth. Her multitude of interests trumps those of the fetus.” I rebut that this woman isn’t guaranteed by anything I’m aware of to avoid certain expenses, inconveniences, hardships, etc. Naturally she may want to, but what moral law do you use to ascribe those rights to her? The above “inalienable rights” or only guaranteed insofar as we don’t abridge the rights of others. And now this is getting out of moral and into legal areas I think.
Finally given your final paragraph:
Using this version of the QLE, it is easy to see why a woman’s prerogative does not extend to after the birth of the child, at least not in our modern society. The main suffering a postpartum mother would experience result from the on-going care of the infant. Infanticide is not justifiable because our society provides an alternative that does not infringe upon the infant’s interest in survival and does not require the mother to assume additional suffering; adoption or foster care. There is no question that these options are morally superior to infanticide since they reduce the suffering experienced by the infant without significantly increasing suffering for any other person. For this reason, post-birth is the rational point to grant a human a moral right to life.
would you say that given our current level of technology and ability to keep a child alive starting some time in the late second trimester that performing a C-section and letting the child have a shot to live would be morally superior to having an abortion since it actually has the same affect of removing the baby from the mother’s womb and keeps the baby from losing that one thing it has? That is assuming that the mother wouldn’t be liable for expenses incurred.
Sid’s 3rd Rebuttal
I’ve finally taken the time to respond. I apologize for the wait.
Basically, you’ve defined ‘God-likeness’ as “that which is unique to humans”, but never explain what “that” is. Since ‘God-likeness’ is at the heart of your SLE, it is necessary to give a clear definition of what it is and how we can recognize it.
You do mention some expressions of that difference such as philosophy, art, and science. But, as you admit, people have differing abilities to express these qualities and differing potentials to express these qualities. Furthermore, some humans have no ability nor potential to express these qualities. With no other way to measure ‘God-likeness’, we must conclude that people have differing degrees of whatever it is that enables people to do philosophy, art, etc. If these abilities are not sufficient to gauge one’s ‘God-likeness’, what is sufficient? The SLE fails to give any measure which doesn’t vary to meaningful degrees within our species.
In contrast, I have laid out a clear definition of what personhood is: “the extent to which a being is able to sense the world, react to it, think, and reflect on their actions.” Varying degrees of personhood easily explains the differences in the ability to express philosophy, art, etc. It also admits to differing degrees of personhood, hence differing capacities for suffering and thus differing moral considerations.
You seem to be under the mistaken impression that my version of the QLE states that one’s level of personhood influences their right to live. One the contrary, every living thing has an interest in living and thus should have some right to live. All personhood does is affect one’s capacity for suffering. Suffering is the common denominator for moral consideration and occurs when a being is unable to pursue its interests. When interests are in conflict, as they are in many circumstances, the most moral action is the one that minimizes suffering across all entities involved.
There is one section of your most recent response that I object to strongly. “I rebut that this woman isn’t guaranteed by anything I’m aware of to avoid certain expenses, inconveniences, hardships, etc.” Surely, you are not saying the woman can be forced to experience avoidable expenses, inconveniences, hardships, etc? She does have moral and legal guarantees that she can’t be forced to experience such things when they are avoidable. Otherwise we may mug this woman with impunity since she has no moral guarantees of escaping expenses, hardships, etc. What moral law do I use to ascribe her those rights? Why the QLE, of course. Experiencing those things causes suffering, which is the unit of moral consideration.
Finally, allow me to answer the question, “…given our current level of technology and ability to keep a child alive starting some time in the late second trimester that performing a C-section and letting the child have a shot to live would be morally superior to having an abortion since it actually has the same affect of removing the baby from the mother’s womb and keeps the baby from losing that one thing it has?”
My answer may surprise you. If any woman chooses to carry a fetus to term, it is morally superior if she does so, even if she incurred the expense. Why? Since the woman chooses to carry a fetus to term, she is stating her interests. Having an abortion would deny her pursuit of her interest and thus cause additional suffering. The question really is, “is it morally superior to force a woman to undergo a c-section when the fetus is viable outside the womb?” My answer is no, even when the woman is spared the financial burden. There is still the suffering that would result from anxiety over the risks of the operation, the pain of the surgery itself, and the scaring that would result.